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A Study in the Choice of Form: 
Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches 
Gail L. ~ e r i o t *  
Pity the poor statute of limitations. Throughout its long 
history, its invocation has often been regarded by the public 
and sometimes even by courts as somehow hypertechnical or  
downright unfair. A defendant who invokes its protection has 
sometimes been perceived as pulling a fast one on the hapless 
plaintiff. This does not mean that these courts believe that no 
limitation whatsoever should be placed upon the time period 
allowed for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit. Hardly anyone is 
foolish enough to suggest such a thing.' Rather, these judicial 
critics of the statute of limitations regard it as an overly rigid 
and mechanical method for determining which cases, in good 
conscience, ought to be time barred and which ought not.2 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; B.A. 
1978, Northwestern University; J.D. 1981, University of Chicago Law School. I 
wish to thank Larry Alexander, Kevin Cole, Emily Sherwin, and Christopher 
W o ~ e l l  for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank 
the participants in the University of San Diego's Conference on Rules and the Rule 
of Law, Frederick Schauer, Jules Coleman, Ruth Gavison, Kenneth Kress, Michael 
Moore, Gerald Postema, and Margaret Jane Radin, for sparking my interest in the 
subject. See generally 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoLV 615 (1991). 
1. Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall once remarked that a cause of action 
without any kind of time limitation would be "utterly repugnant to the genius of 
our laws." Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805). 
2. I t  is not unusual to come across a court apologizing for what it perceives to 
be a bad result forced upon it by a formal reading of the statute. See, e.g., T.J. 
Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 361 F. Supp. 838, 842 (C.D. Cal. 1972) 
(dismissing admiralty action subject to a twoyear statute of limitations, despite fact 
that plaintiff had originally mistakenly believed its remedy to be within the 
Federal Tort Claims Ad instead of the Suits in Admiralty Act, but stating that 
"tilt is unfortunate that the suit is so barred"), affd, 508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Martin v. Grace Line, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 395, 
396-97 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that statute of limitations barred action against 
United States, despite fact that plaintiff did not know that United States was the 
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Contrast the statute of limitations with the doctrine of 
laches, that  golden girl of equity jurisdiction. Little 
dissatisfaction is expressed by courts applying it. Instead, they 
wax poetic about its virtues. According to one, "[Llaches is not 
a hidebound rule like a statute of limitations . . . but is a 
creature of courts of equity, founded upon common sense and 
natural ju~tice."~ Such a description carries with i t  the 
peculiar suggestion that, in contrast, the statute of limitations 
is founded upon something other than common sense and 
natural justice. Laches, such courts have commented, "cannot 
be used to .  . . defeat justice'" and "cannot be used as an 
instrument of oppre~sion."~ Again, the reader is left to wonder 
whether the statute of limitations can be used to defeat justice 
or to work oppression. 
Of course, the popularity of the laches doctrine among 
courts is hardly proof of its superiority over the statute of 
limitations. Instead, it may simply suggest that our legal 
literature, dominated as it is by a seemingly inexhaustible 
supply of judicial opinions, has a bias in favor of doctrines that 
vest power in the hands of the judiciary. Courts like them; 
hence, the legal system likes them. Insofar as the two 
approaches can be seen as alternative positions in a struggle 
for power and influence between lawmakers (such as 
legislatures and appellate courts) and law administrators (such 
as trial courts), the laches approach represents a victory for the 
administrators-but not necessarily for the community. Courts 
would be the last to express reservations about laches because 
appropriate party to  sue, even though the result was "unfortunate"); Boutin v. 
Cumbo, 278 F. Supp. 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (applying the statute of limitations 
to dismiss action despite fact that defendant had been out of jurisdiction though 
decrying result as "unfortunate"); Skinner v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 598, 599 
(S.D. Tex. 1962) (dismissing case of taxpayers who had erroneously paid excessive 
taxes as time barred but noting that "[tlhe Court is most sympathetic with the 
unfortunate position in which the Plaintiffs find themselves, and is deeply 
disturbed over the fact that, but for the statute of limitations, it is undisputed 
they would be entitled to the refund"); Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 631 P.2d 
222, 236 (Kan. 1981) (holding that the effect of a four-year statute of repose for 
medical malpractice was "unfortunate" but nevertheless mandatory upon the court). 
Whether these courts perceived the statute of limitations to be generally 
wrongheaded or whether they considered the result in the particular case to be an 
unfortunate but unavoidable result of a generally good and wise law is unclear. 
3. First Nat'l Bank v. Wise, 177 So. 636, 639 (Ma. 1937). 
4. Westworth Village v. Mitchell, 414 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 
5. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Humphrys, 97 F.2d 849, 858 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 305 U.S. 628 (1938). 
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it vests them with nearly full discretion to dismiss a claim they 
believe ought to be time barred. If laches is wrongheaded, it is 
wrongheaded precisely because it vests too much power and 
discretion in the hands of the courts. 
Cries of foul are thus more likely to come from (1) 
dissatisfied litigants who object to a particular court's judgment 
pursuant to the laches doctrine and (2) potential litigants who 
object to the difficulty they have in planning their future 
behavior given the uncertainties of laches. These litigants have 
fewer opportunities to  register their objections publicly; thus, it 
is not surprising that we see so little criticism of the laches 
approach in the legal literature. It would be serious error, 
however, to interpret this silence as approval of courts' 
sentimental and self-serving view of laches. 
The laches doctrine tends to take its licks only indirectly, 
in the form of occasional general warnings about the dangers of 
vesting too much discretion in the hands of judges. One of the 
most dramatic warnings was voiced by Lord Camden? 
The discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants: It  is always 
unknown: It  is different in different men: It  is casual, and 
depends upon constitution, temper and passion.-In the best 
it is often times caprice: In the worst i t  is every vice, folly, 
and passion, to which human nature can be liable.7 
The criticisms of both approaches seem eminently sensible, 
at least to anyone not fully jaded by the view that it is 
impossible to constrain the discretion of judges by imposing 
rules upon them.8 Indeed, the statute of limitations does 
sometimes produce results that seem hypertechnical in view of 
its underlying policy concerns. Like all rules, it is both 
overinclusive and underinclu~ive.~ Formal application of a 
6. More recently, Justice Scalia has become known as one of the leading 
critics of such discretion in judges' hands. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as  
a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (generally calling for an increase 
in the influence of rules in American law); see also Gail L. Heriot, Way Beyond 
Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1945 (1991) (discussing problems created when too much 
discretion is given to moral decision makers). 
7. Hindson & Kersey, quoted in 8 HOWELL'S TATE TRIALS 57 n.t (1816). 
8. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (arguing that 
the language of rules can constrain judges' discretion). 
9. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 268 (1974); Duncan K e ~ e d y ,  Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1695-96 (1976); 
William Powers, Jr., Structural Aspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within 
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rigid statute of limitations occasionally results in the dismissal 
of a suit that was not, in anyone's view, unreasonably delayed 
and whose delayed filing caused no undue prejudice to  the 
defendant. Similarly, formal application occasionally allows a 
lawsuit to  be maintained that has clearly been unreasonably 
and harmfully delayed. On the other hand, however, a doctrine 
like laches, which vests the court with the authority to 
determine whether the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed 
bringing a lawsuit t o  the detriment of the defendant, also 
produces less than optimal results because, among other 
things, it relies so heavily upon the wisdom and good faith of 
the trial judge. When judicial wisdom and good faith fail us, as 
they sometimes do, highly discretionary doctrines like laches 
fail us t0o.l0 
A. The Lawmaker's Choice of Formulation 
In promulgating any kind of law, one of the tasks a law- 
maker must perform is to select the best formulation of that 
law-the one that delegates to  the law administrator the level 
of discretion and authority that is just right. This is a complex - 
task," as I hope to illustrate in this article, using the statute 
of limitations and the doctrine of laches as my example. 
The doctrine of laches and the statute of limitations are an 
interesting and familiar example of a rule-standard pair.12 
Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theory, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1280431 (1979); 
Schauer, supra note 8, at 534-35. 
10. See Scalia, supra note 6. 
11. See, e g . ,  Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9. It is also a thankless task, since 
one could hardly expect the law administrator to be happy about those occasions 
when the lawmaker, for whatever reason, prefers formulations that purport to limit 
the law administrator's discretion and authority. The tension this scenario will 
create between lawmakers and law administrators is likely to be significant. 
12. These doctrinal pairs come in two kinds, those that apply in combination to 
the same areas of human endeavor and those that have separate bailiwicks. Exam- 
ples of the first category include the laws concerning acquisition of a driver's 
license. In general, one must be at  least sixteen years old to get a driver's license. 
This rule is designed to weed out those who are likely to be bad drivers. Passing 
one's sixteenth birthday, however, is not enough. In addition, one must take a 
driving test administered by an employee of the division of motor vehicles. That 
employee is charged with determining whether the applicant possesses the skills 
and temperament necessary to function safely on the highways. Because of the 
judgment involved, this law is more standardlike than the age test. Like the age 
test, however, it is designed to weed out those who are likely to be bad drivers. 
Such pairs of laws, applied in tandem, are common. Another example is the com- 
bination of a strict rulelike speed limit with a standardlike prohibition against 
driving too fast for prevailing conditions. By combining a rule and a standard, the 
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They are two differing legal formulations designed to deal with 
the same underlying legal concern-that at  some point a 
plaintiff's cause of action ought to perish for lack of timeliness. 
They do so, however, in very different ways. The statute of 
limitations represents a r~ le l ike '~  approach and governs cases 
at law;14 the laches doctrine is a standardlike15 approach and 
applies to cases in equity? Much of this article is devoted t o  
a discussion of how and why this rule-standard pair came 
about. This article will address why legislatures might have 
chosen a rulelike formulation for cases at law while equity 
chancellors and courts chose to apply the standardlike laches 
doctrine to  equity. It will conclude that there are several fac- 
tors, any of which would provide justification for the develop- 
ment of these starkly different approaches to limitations 
law." My hope is, of course, to shed light on the factors that 
law has cast two nets with which to catch the evil i t  is seeking to prevent. If one 
fails, the other may still be successfbl. 
The other kind of doctrinal pair is comprised of doctrines that have application 
to separate areas of the law. Included in this category is the statute of limitations 
and laches dichotomy, which is the subject of this article. 
13. See infia text accompanying notes 41-44. 
14. Although I have been discussing the statute of limitations in the singular, 
there are, of course, many statutes of limitation both within single political juris- 
dictions and across political jurisdictions. Statutes of limitation tend to have rule- 
like formulations, but they do so in varying degrees. Some statutes of limitation 
are cast in very rulelike terms. For example, a statute of limitations that does not 
provide tolling for infancy, insanity, or imprisonment is quite rulelike. See, e.g., 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 8 752 (West 1991). This type of statute provides a 
fured time period in which to bring a lawsuit regardless of the hardship this might 
place on the potential plaintiff or lack of detriment it might place on the potential 
defendant. In contrast, a statute that does provide for tolling is less rulelike. See, 
eg., 21 Jam. 1, ch. 16, 4 2 (1623) (Eng.) (providing tolling for "feme covert, non 
compos mentis, imprison[ment, and for being] beyond the seas."). Questions of fact 
and law regarding whether the plaintiff is an infant, insane, or imprisoned within 
the meaning of the law make the law somewhat more difficult to administer 
properly. On the other side of the coin, it vests the adjudicator with somewhat 
more authority to tailor the result to the fads of the case. Statutes of limitation 
that provide for tolling if for any reason the plaintiff did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, are still less rulelike. See, e.g., 
IDAHO CODE $ 5219(4) (1992) (limitation period for cause of action arising out of 
foreign objects inadvertently left in plaintiffs body). 
15. See infia text accompanying note 45. 
16. Just as statutes of limitation can vary, so too can the doctrine of laches. 
Although all formulations tend toward the standard end of the rule-standard spec- 
trum, some jurisdictions vest more discretion in the hands of the adjudicator than 
others. Compare Gruca v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1259 & n.8 
(3d Cir. 1974) with Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 366 (6th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). 
17. See infra part 1I.D. 
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generally influence a lawmaker's choice of formulation along 
the rule-standard continuum. 
B. Convergence 
Much of the remainder of this article is devoted to the 
interesting phenomenon of convergence.18 Over time, the ap- 
plication of both the statute of limitations and the doctrine of 
laches has changed. The statute of limitations has, in practice, 
become more standardlike and, to a lesser extent, the doctrine 
of laches more rulelike. The formulation selected by the 
original lawmakers has thus-for better or worse-been slowly 
altered by subsequent law administrators. This phenomenon is 
important because i t  casts doubt on the lawmakers' ability to 
determine the optimal formulation for a given law along the 
rule-standard continuum and to see that it is administered in 
that  form-at least over long periods of time. Law admin- 
istrators enter the picture and alter the formulation. 
The courts responsible for applying statutes of limitation 
justify their decision to make them more standardlike by ar- 
guing that times have changed and outdated laws need to be 
modified. They reason that the enacting legislatures would 
have wholeheartedly approved the adoption of an expansive 
discovery rule and considered such a rule a valid interpre- 
tation, under the circumstances. 
Maybe these courts are right; the argument certainly has 
its sympathetic side. Regardless of the proffered justifications, 
this transformation has effected a fundamental change in the 
theoretical underpinnings of limitations law. Unfortunately, 
once that change is acknowledged, the assumption that the 
original promulgators of the statutes of limitation would ap- 
prove of the transformation begins to seem dubious. Indeed, as 
I will discuss, there are a number of reasons the enacting legis- 
latures might be ill-disposed towards the transformation that 
has occurred. 
This article includes a discussion of what might be causing 
this curious convergence trend;'' whether convergence is a 
positive or negative influence in the law;20 and insofar as it is 
perceived as negative, the difficulty legislators face trying to 
18. See infia part 111. 
19. See infia pp. 953-60. 
20. See infk pp. 960-63. 
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control it." This article concludes that there are reasons to  
distrust judges who transform rulelike statutes of limitation 
into standards. Sadly, despite their best intentions, judges 
interpreting and applying statutes of limitation have an incen- 
tive systematically to undervalue the need for rules. As I will 
explain below, judges tend to  favor more standardlike formula- 
tions on the ground that they yield "fairer" outcomes and there- 
by reject rulelike formulations that provide superior guidance 
to potential litigants. Rather than attempt to reconcile these 
two competing functions of law-the guidance of adjudication 
and the guidance of conduct-in a manner that reflects commu- 
nity consensus, judges tend, for reasons of self-interest, sys- 
tematically to  favor adjudication. Even more sadly, this is a 
tendency that legislatures acting as lawmakers may be unable 
to control, given the demands of the separation of powers 
doctrine. 
11. THE FORMULATION F LIMITATIONS LAW 
ALONG THE RULE-STANDARD CONTINUUM 
A. An Early History of  the Statute of Limitations 
and the Doctrine of Laches 
Although English law has long evidenced a desire to keep 
stale cases out of the courts, in practice this policy has been ap- 
plied in an uneven and erratic manner in both real property 
and personal actions. , 
Limitations on actions to recover real property were estab- 
lished early in Roman law.22 England's experience, however, 
was spottier. A good example is the writ of novel disseisin. 
From its name, one would think that no action could be main- 
tained under a writ of novel disseisin unless the disseisin had 
been recent or "novel." One would expect to find some 
device-rulelike or standardlike-that effectively cut off a 
would-be plaintiff attempting t o  bring a tardy action.23 In 
21. See infia part W. 
22. See RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND 
SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRNATE LAW 318-22 (James C. Ledlie trans., 3d ed., Augustus 
M. Kelley 1970) (1940). 
23. Indeed, Pollock and Maitland tell us that in Normandy-where the writ of 
novel disseisin originated-such a law existed. Only disseisins occurring since the 
last harvest were cognizable. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, ch. iv, !j 2, at 51 (2d ed. 1909). 
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England, however, this was not the case.24 Common law 
courts put no time limitation upon litigants. They apparently 
viewed such limitations as the responsibility or prerogative of 
the king or the Parliament, which acted infrequently and on an 
ad  hoc basis. No rule or standard was formulated that could be 
applied indefinitely into the future. Rather than set a specific 
length of time between the date the cause of action arose and 
the latest date the case could be brought, the king and Par- 
liament based limitations on a fixed date in legal memory. No 
actions arising prior to that fixed date would be entertained.25 
For example, a t  the time of Glanville, a writ of novel dis- 
seisin would be entertained only if the act of disseisin occurred 
after the king's most recent trip to N~rmandy.'~ Glanville 
quotes from the writ of novel disseisin as it stood in his time: 
"The King to the Sheriff, Health. N. complains to me, that R. 
has, unjustly and without a Judgment, disseised him of his free 
Tenement, in such a Vill, since my last voyage into Norman- 
dy . . . ?' Unfortunately, such a method of time barring caus- 
es of action is only effective if English monarchs continue to 
make regular trips to Normandy. When that stopped, other ar- 
rangements had to be made." 
Limitations on personal actions were even less developed. 
At both early Roman and early common law, rights in contract 
and in tort were, in theory, perpetual. Under the common law, 
however, certain procedural requirements stood in the way of 
the assertion of truly hoary claims. Tort actions, for example, 
were extinguished upon the death of either the plaintiff or the 
defendant .29 
24. Id. 
25. By their very nature such measures had to be revised from time to time. 
Id. 
26. RANJLF DE GLANVILLE, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE 
REALM OF ENGLAND 167 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1983). 
27. Id. (footnote omitted). 
28. By 1194, the year in which the available plea rolls began, the limiting date 
was Richard I's first coronation in 1189. Later, the date was changed to Henry 
III's coronation. In 1236 or 1237, the date changed by statute to the time of Henry 
III's voyage to  Brittany in 1230. No later date was fixed until 1275, when a date 
in 1242, said to be the date of Henry III's fwst voyage to Gascony, was fured. 
Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 39 (Eng.). This date was the only 
time limitation upon a novel disseisin case until the reign of Henry VIII, three 
centuries later, when Parliament Grst saw the folly of the ad hoc approach to limi- 
tations. 2 POLLOCK &  LAND, supra note 23, at  51. Most writs had a similar 
history. See id. at 51, 8 1  (tracing the history of time limitation upon the writ of 
right and the writ of mort d'ancestor). 
29. See Thomas E. Atkinson, Some Procedural Aspects of the Statute? of Limita- 
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Not until the reign of Henry VIII did Parliament enact leg- 
islation that moved in the direction of creating a self-perpetuat- 
ing limitations system for real property actions.30 The pream- 
ble to that statute articulates the legislature's reasons for im- 
plementing such a mechanism to  time bar state actions: 
Forasmuch as the time of Limitation appointed for suing 
[various writs of action] . . . extend, and be of so far and long 
time past, that i t  is above the remembrance of any living 
man, truly to try and know the perfect certainty of such 
things . . . to the great danger of mens consciences . . . and i t  
is also a great occasion of much trouble, vexacion and suits to 
the King's loving subjects at the common laws of this realm; 
so that no man, although he . . . [has] been in peaceable pos- 
session of a long season . . . is or can be in any surety, quiet- 
ness or rest . . . be i t  therefore enacted . . . .31 
The policies behind the statute are thus clear. Parliament 
wanted to  guard against the dangers of trying a case for which 
the relevant evidence had been lost or destroyed and to  protect 
against the uncertainty that arises when potential defendants 
are left in limbo, not knowing whether or not they will be 
Nothing in the statute suggests the members of Parliament 
intended to promote a plaintiff-focused limitations principle 
that would not extinguish a cause of action until the plaintiff 
had a reasonable opportunity to bring a lawsuit. ~ndeed, the 
statute may suggest, if anything, an emphasis on the defen- 
dant-focused principle that no cause of action should be main- 
tainable if the defendant, through no fault of his own, has lost 
valuable evidence in his defense or  has otherwise innocently 
changed position to his detriment. 
The Statute of Henry VIII did not provide a system of limi- 
tation rules applicable to all common law actions. Curiously, it 
applied to  some writs of action but not to overlapping writs 
tions, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 165 (1927); Developments in the Law-Statutes of 
Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1950). 
30. 3 2 H e n . 8 ,  ch. 2(1540)(Eng.). 
31. Id. 8 1. 
32. The former category includes all direct and indirect costs to society of incor- 
rect factual conclusions resulting from the staleness of evidence and all direct and 
indirect costs to society of fabricated evidence, regardless of the outcome of the 
cases. The latter category includes the costs to society resulting from potential 
defendants failing to take an optimal position or changing from an optimal position 
to a suboptimal position out of fear of future litigation. 
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that gave different remedies for similar wrongs. For example, 
the Statute of Henry VIII operated to bar the traditional real 
action if not brought within the period it specified. It did not, 
however, bar a claimant's right of entry.33 
This rather sizable gap in the law was not closed until 
eighty-three years later when Parliament passed the Statute of 
James I in 1 6 2 3 , ~ ~  marking the advent of reasonably effective 
and systematic rules to govern time limitation. The Statute of 
James I provided specific lengths of time for numerous real 
property and personal actions. It explicitly tolled these limita- 
tion periods for infancy, insanity, imprisonment, coverture, and 
absence from the realm, but was silent concerning ignorance. 
This statute is the model for statutes of limitation adopted by 
American legislatures. 
Nowhere in either of these English statutes did the legisla- 
ture acknowledge the existence of equity courts. Indeed, the 
statutes are so explicit in referring to common law writs that it 
seems doubtfbl that the members of Parliament believed the 
statutes would cover matters brought before equity courts. Per- 
haps it was merely oversight that no provision was made for 
limitations in equity. After all, during the reign of Henry VIII, 
the typical, well-informed individual might not have considered 
equity courts to be courts, just as many persons during our 
time do not consider administrative agencies to be courts. Par- 
liament may simply have forgotten them. On the other hand, 
perhaps it was deliberate. In any event, equity courts did not 
perceive themselves a t  the time to be bound by these stat- 
u t e ~ . ~ ~  
Nevertheless, the legal norm underlying the statutes of 
limitation-that there must be some time limitation on poten- 
tial plaintiffs-was not entirely lost upon equity judges. Nu- 
merous cases from the era of the statutes of Henry VIII and 
James I, in which the court dismissed the action for un- 
timeliness, demonstrate the concern with which equity courts 
handled the issue.36 Not one of these cases actually uses the 
33. Bevil's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 862, 876 (C.P. 1575). 
34. 21 Jam. 1, ch. 16, 8 1 (1623) (Eng.). 
35. See Halsted v. Little, 21 Eng. Rep. 121 (H.C. Ch. 1632); Evans v. Leasure, 
21 Eng. Rep. 127 (H.C. Ch. 1630-31). 
36. See Simonds v. Lomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 113 (H.C. Ch. 1623); Garford v. Hum- 
ble, 21 Eng. Rep. 113 (H.C. Ch. 1618); Byden v. Loveden, 21 Eng. Rep. 121 (H.C. 
Ch. 1613); Moyle v. Dom. Roberts, 21 Eng. Rep. 776 (Ch. 1629-30); Winchcomb v. 
Hall, 21 Eng. Rep. 501 (Ch. 1629-30); Porter v. Pretty, 21 Eng. Rep. 66 (Ch. 1604); 
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term "laches." Yet it is clear that, in some form or another, the 
courts deciding them had subscribed to the substance of that 
doctrine. The Latin maxim "interest republicz ut sit finis 
l i t i~m"~' is repeated in many of the cases. 
In the nineteenth century, equity courts decided the laches 
question according to the special circumstances of each case.38 
Power was vested in the equity judge to do what was best. This 
is in sharp contrast to the rulelike way in which law courts ad- 
ministered the statutes of limitation. In the early nineteenth 
century, most American courts applied statutes of limitation 
quite formalistically, thus magnifying the existing rulelike 
qualities of the statutes.39 When asked to  provide an exception 
for the plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of action, one court 
stated: 
[The statute of limitations] contains no such exception. To al- 
low i t  would make the statute virtually inoperative. Those in 
possession of real property, instead of being secure, would be 
constantly subject to actions commenced twenty, thirty, or 
even double that number of years, by some one who shows 
that he or she was ignorant of their [sic] claim or righte40 
The two approaches to  limitations policy-standardlike 
laches and rulelike statutes of limitation-were miles apart. 
B. The Nature of Rules and Standards 
and the Environments that Give Rise to Them 
In order to understand why a statute of limitations is rule- 
like and the doctrine of laches is standardlike, one must first 
examine the nature of rules and standards. 
Rules are characterized by simplicity of administration. A 
rule will turn on a very limited number of easily ascertainable 
facts. If those facts are found to exist, the legal outcome 
Clench v. Tomley, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603); Blackwell v. Simpson, 21 Eng. Rep. 
95 (Ch. 1582-83); Sedgwick v. Evan, 21 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ch. 1582-83). 
37. Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase as follows: "It concerns the state 
that there be an end of lawsuits. It is for the general welfare that a period be put 
to litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 814 (6th ed. 1979). 
38. See, e.g., Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 288, 319 (1867); Glenn v. Smith, 17 
Md. 260, 282 (1861). 
39. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Union Pac. Ry., 35 F. 35 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888); Craw- 
ford v. Gaulden, 33 Ga. 173 (1862); Washington County v. Mahaska County, 47 
Iowa 57 (1877); Mast v. Easton, 22 N.W. 253 (Minn. 1885). 
40. Campbell v. Long, 20 Iowa 382, 387 (1866). 
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prescribed by the law will be a ~ertainty.~' The typical rule 
will be formulated in this way: "If A is true, then X shall be the 
result," where A is an easily ascertainable fact and X is a spe- 
cific legal outcome. 
The degree to which a given law will be considered rulelike 
will thus depend upon the number of difficult-to-resolve facts 
that the law puts directly in issue and the amount of discretion 
afforded the administrator in deciding the legal outcome given 
the facts." Consequently, the formulation "If A is true, then X 
shall be the result" is an extremely rulelike law, especially if A 
is an easily ascertainable fact. "If A and B are true, then X 
shall be the result" is slightly less rulelike if B is a fact that is 
not easily ascertainable, such as state of mind. Still less 
rulelike would be this formulation: "If A and B are true, then X 
shall be the result unless the administrator is convinced that X 
would cause the end of civilization as we know it." Because the 
discretionary leash given to the administrator under this latter 
formulation is extremely short, however, it is still proper to 
classify the formulation as very rulelike relative to other pos- 
sible formulations. 
A rule purports to be simple to administer because it pur- 
ports to shield the administrator from having to consider the 
full range of factual circumstances that might be relevant t o  
the underlying legal norm.'3 Whether it is in fact simple t o  
administer will depend upon the administrator's approach to 
rules in general or to the rule at issue." For example, a stat- 
ute of limitations that states, "A cause of action against a 
decedent's estate will, without exception, be barred if the com- 
plaint embodying that cause of action is not fded within one 
year from the date on which a death certificate is filed," is in 
the tradition of a rule. This rule purports to direct the court not 
to consider whether the plaintiff was notified of the decedent's 
demise, whether the plaintiff knew or should have known of his 
cause of action, whether the injury was significant, or whether 
any evidence favorable to the defendant has been lost. These 
questions presumably have already been weighed wholesale by 
41. For an excellent discussion of the language of rules and whether it can or 
should restrain decision makers, see Schauer, supra note 8. 
42. See Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1687. 
43. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 266-67; Powers, supra note 9, at 
1277-78; Schauer, supra note 8, at 520-23. 
44. See Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
PoL'Y 645 (1991). 
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the legislature and thus taken into consideration in for- 
mulating the rule. The rule attempts to  shroud all other issues 
from the administrator's consideration so that the only factual 
issues will be: (1) whether this is a cause of action against the 
estate of a person for whom a death certificate has been filed, 
(2) the date the death certificate was filed, (3) the date the 
complaint was filed, and (4) whether more than a year has 
passed from the time the death certificate was filed t o  the time 
the complaint was filed. In nearly every case, once these factu- 
al questions are answered, application will be simple for all but 
the most incurably argumentative. 
Standards, on the other hand, allow a broad range of facts 
to be considered. Moreover, once every possible fact question 
has been answered, the legal outcome of the case may still be 
in doubt, subject to the administrator's discretion. Thus, a 
typical formulation of a standard will be: "If, upon consider- 
ation of A, B, C, D, and any other relevant factor, the court 
fmds that the application of outcome X is the most desirable 
one, then X shall be the outcome." Nothing is shrouded from 
consideration under such a formulation; everything can poten- 
tially affect the outcome.45 
As I have suggested earlier in discussing the statute of 
limitations in particular, rules often receive only grumbling 
acceptance in court opinions.46 On the other hand, courts sel- 
dom grumble about  standard^.^' None of this is surprising 
given that courts derive power from the discretion vested in 
them by standards; it should be expected. 
What is curious is the fact that standards tend t o  receive 
favorable play not only in judicial opinions48 but also in the 
conceptions of justice popularized by history and literature. The 
explanation may be simple: Standards lend themselves to a 
sense of dramatic immediacy that rules cannot generate. When 
it comes to drama, therefore, people prefer their doers of justice 
to be actual adjudicators of individual controversies rather than 
aloof promulgators of general law and to be wise and all power- 
ful rather than mechanical and hemmed-in. 
45. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 258; K e ~ e d y ,  supra note 9, at 
1688; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Lugal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J .  LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); see also Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and 
Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382-83 (1985). 
46. See cases cited supra note 2. 
47. . See cases cited supra notes 3-5. 
48. See supra notes 3-4. 
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Nevertheless, popular stories concerning both approaches 
lend insight into the nature of rules and standards and their 
relative strengths and weaknesses as instruments of the law. 
Moreover, they illustrate well the differing legal environments 
that tend to  give rise to each. 
Perhaps the most well known of these stories is that of 
Solomon. He was among the great practitioners of the discre- 
tionary, standardlike approach to justice. Fearful that he would 
not govern wisely, Solomon asked God to grant him "an under- 
standing mind to govern" the people of I~rael.~' God complied, 
granting his request with these words, "Behold I give you a 
wise and discerning mind, so that none like you has been 
before you and none like you shall arise after you."50 From 
that point, Solomon sat in judgment of the people of Israel and 
became known among the surrounding nations as an extraordi- 
narily wise ruler.51 His rule was a personal one. No adminis- 
trative body intervened between Solomon and the litigants 
before him. He did not promulgate rules prior to deciding an 
individual case in order to facilitate adjudication. Rather, when 
called upon to adjudicate a case, he reacted to the totality of 
the circumstances before him and tailored his "rule" of decision 
appropriately. 
The Bible records only one case as an illustration of 
Solomon's wisdom-the well-known maternity dispute between 
two harlots.52 In that story, Solomon does not apply any pre- 
conceived rule; his general standard was "do the right thing." 
He reacts to the full range of the circumstances before him. 
Shrewdly summing up the situation, he orders the child cut in 
half.53 One of the women consents to this barbarous sugges- 
tion." When the other objects and protests that she would 
rather lose custody of the child than see him killed,55 Solomon 
awards custody to her.56 
The people of Israel "heard of the judgment which the king 
had rendered; and they stood in awe of the king, because they 
1 Kings 3:9 (Revised Standard); see 2 Chronicles 1:lO. 
1 Kings 3:12 (Revised Standard); see 2 Chronicles 1:12. 
1 Kings 3:28 (Revised Standard); see 2 Chronicles 1113, 9:l-4. 
1 Kings 3:16-28 (Revised Standard). 
Id. at 3:25. 
Id. at 3:26. 
Id. 
Id. at 3:26-27. 
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perceived that the wisdom of God was in him, t o  render jus- 
ti~e."~' 
Solomon ruled for forty years,s8 during which Israel pros- 
pered under his just reign.59 Rehoboam, Solomon's son and 
succes~or,6~ showed none of his father's leadership talent. To 
the contrary, he is described in Ecclesiasticus as "the folly of 
the na t i~n '~ '  and one "that had little ~isdom.'~'  The result 
of his conduct was rebe l l i~n .~~  The kingdom divided, never to 
reunite." His is one of the great tragedies of the Old Testa- 
ment. 
Historical and literary figures illustrating the contrary tra- 
dition-a rulelike approach to law and adjudication-tend not 
to  assume such heroic proportions in the public consciousness, 
57. Id. at 3:28. Did Solomon believe that no biological mother could ever con- 
sent to having her child cut in half and thus that he was awarding custody to the 
biological mother? Or did he believe that regardless of the identity of the biological 
mother, it was in the child's best interests to be placed with a woman who cared 
more for his safety than for her right of custody? We will never know. We can be 
sure, however, that Solomon could not have successfully used this trick twice. The 
next child custody case could not be resolved by threatening to cut the child in 
half since both contenders would have been forewarned and reacted accordingly. 
Solomon's was not a legal system built on rule or precedent. 
58. Id. at 11:42. 
59. See id. chs. 6-10. 
60. Id. at 11:43. 
61. Ecclesiasticus 47:27 (Douay). 
62. Id. at 47:28. 
63. 1 Kings 12:19 (Revised Standard). 
64. Although the people had grudgingly tolerated high taxes and mandatory 
labor under Solomon, they were not inclined to do so for Rehoboam. The Bible re- 
ports that a delegation of Israelites came to Rehoboam and asked that the "heavy 
yoke" upon them be lightened. Id. at  12:3-4. The Bible reports that Rehoboam 
reacted as follows: 
Then King Rehoboam took counsel with the old men, who had stood be- 
fore Solomon his father while he was yet alive, saying, "How do you 
advise me to answer this people?" And they said to him, "If you will be a 
servant to this people today and serve them, and speak good words to 
them when you answer them, then they will be your servants for ever." 
But he forsook the counsel which the old men gave him, and took counsel 
with the young men who had grown up with him and stood before him. 
And he said to them, 'What do you advise that we answer this people 
who have said to me Zighten the yoke that your father put upon us'? " 
And the young men who had grown up with him said to him, Thus  shall 
you speak to this people who said to you, 'Your father made our yoke 
heavy, but do you lighten it for us'; thus shall you say to them, 'My little 
finger is thicker than my father's loins. And now, whereas my father laid 
upon you a heavy yoke, I will add to your yoke. My father chastised you 
with whips but I will chastise you with scorpions.' " 
Id. at 12:6-14. 
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but they are certainly not unknown. Solon, the great lawgiver 
of sixth century B.C. Athens, is an excellent example of that 
tradition. Solon's story is quite different from Solomon's. Solo- 
mon was born a prince; Solon was forced into public life 
because, a t  a time of considerable strife in Athens, he was per- 
haps the only man in all of Athens who was acceptable to each 
of its factions.65 
Once in office, Solon set himself about the task of legal 
reform. He established an  elaborate code governing such things 
as citizenship, inheritances, and commerce.66 When these 
reform measures were in place, Solon sought out the members 
of the Athenian Council and requested them to swear that they 
would allow these changes in the law to remain in place for a 
period of ten years. Once he had secured those promises, Solon 
left. Sailing away on a ship, Solon was not seen in Athens for 
ten years?? 
The legacy of his legal reforms, however, continued. Firmly 
in  place, they no longer required his presence. Athens pros- 
pered and indeed became one of the well-springs of western 
culture. 
The contrast between Solomon and Solon reveals some- 
thing about the nature of rules and standards. Both were great 
and wise men of the law. Portraits of both grace the courtroom 
of the U.S. Supreme Court along with the likes of Moses, 
Hammurabi, Charlemagne, and Louis IX. Solon's code of rules, 
however, was the product of a legal community that was at war 
with itself. Lawmakers (Athenian Council members and per- 
sons seeking to influence that body) had conflicting ideas con- 
cerning the public good. Such a setting can only produce rules. 
Warring factions would never be able to agree upon standard- 
like formulations, whose underlying principles tend to be all 
too transparent. Rules were a practical way out of this dilem- 
ma. 
This lack of consensus must have extended not only to 
Athenian lawmakers but also to Athenian law administrators. 
Thus, even if the lawmakers had been able to agree upon prin- 
ciples, they might have had to resort to rules rather than stan- 
dards to implement those principles because they could not rely 
65. Set! ~UTARCH, THE LNES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 97, 104-05 
(John Dryden trans., Arthur Clough rev., Modern Library 1979) (1954). 
66. See id. at 108-12; MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 51-80 (1986). 
67. PLuTARcH, supra note 65, at 112-13. 
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upon the law administrators to exercise discretion uniformly, in 
an appropriate manner. Rules were thus necessary? The use 
of standards could only result in an avalanche of unpredictable 
or wrongly-decided cases from the point of view of Athenian 
lawmakers. 
Solomon had no problem with heterogeneous values among 
his lawmakers and law adjudicators. Scripture does not record 
any lack of consensus among the lawmakers of ancient Israel. 
Solomon was himself the lawmaker; he was king. There is no 
evidence of warring factions attempting to influence him on 
matters of family law principles. Similarly, Solomon personally 
conducted adjudications and thus he relied upon his "law 
administrator to adjudicate uniformly and appr~pr i a t e ly .~~  
Solon's rule drafting cannot compete with Solomon's adju- 
dication of the single maternity dispute on a literary level. 
Solomon's ability to react wisely to a discrete human predica- 
ment makes for fascinating story telling. That does not mean, 
however, that Solon's methods cannot compete on a jurispru- 
dential level. Solomon's method has many disadvantages. I t  
requires a lawmaker who is single-minded concerning princi- 
ples of the law. It also requires a steady supply of wise admin- 
istrators. When Solomon passed from the scene, no one could 
take his place. Rehoboam proved to be ill-suited to the task, 
and the Davidic dynasty's empire was doomed. Solon's rule- 
governed legal system, on the other hand, though less dramat- 
ic, depends only upon the existence of one wise lawmaker. Once 
the rule is promulgated, its wise promulgator is not 
immediately required to ensure the day-to-day functioning of 
68. The fact that many of the areas of the law Solon touched, commerce for ex- 
ample, require predictability so that citizens can act in reliance could only serve to 
reinforce this tendency towards rules. 
69. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of Solomon's fame as a man of justice 
with his emphasis on standards in any other way. He would never have been con- 
sidered a wise man had he simply told his ministers, "I command you to look a t  
all the circumstances and arrive a t  the best solution." Arriving a t  standardlike 
formulations of legal norms is often simple; applying them to actual controversies 
requires a wisdom that too few of us possess. Under those circumstances, the fame 
would rightly belong to the ministers, not to Solomon, a mere source of broad, 
imprecise standards. 
Solon's brand of justice had precisely the opposite characteristic. His fame was 
the result of promulgating rules to guide adjudication, not from any actual adjud- 
ication. As Solon himself perceived, once a well-considered code of rules was 
promulgated, the most difficult task was complete. The only difficult task 
remaining is to avoid the temptation to modG the rules inappropriately. 
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the legal system. Solon could, as he in fact did, take an extend- 
ed vacation. 
C. Selecting a Formulation 
Along a Rule-Standard Continuum 
How does the lawmaker decide which formulation along 
the rule-standard continuum to adopt? One can only guess a t  
the motivations of the British Parliaments during the reigns of 
Henry VIII and James I or of the multitude of Anglo-American 
legislatures that followed them in adopting the relatively rule- 
like statutes of limitation. The same is true of the motivations 
of the British chancellors and the British and American equity 
courts that developed the more standardlike laches doctrine. It 
seems likely, however, that the same reasons that made stan- 
dards appropriate for Solomon and rules for Solon would apply 
here. 
Any' individual lawmaker will have to consider the follow- 
ing in selecting a point along the rule-standard continuum to 
cast the law: (1) the ability of the formulation to guide law 
administrators to achieve appropriate case outcomes, (2) the 
ability of the formulation to guide actors towards appropriate 
conduct, (3) the relative importance of guiding law administra- 
tors to achieve appropriate case outcomes and guiding actors to 
appropriate cond~ct , '~  and (4) the practical ability of the form- 
ulation to attract the consensus of fellow members of the law- 
making body.'' 
1. Guiding adjudication 
A lawmaker's choice along the rule-standard continuum 
can be judged, in part, according to its ability to function as a 
guide for adjudication. An optimum guide for adjudication is, of 
course, one that over time will yield appropriate outcomes in 
70. The distinction between law as a conduct guide and law as an adjudicative 
guide has been discussed at length in Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Con- 
duct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
Professor Dan-Cohen has suggested that different laws can hKiU these separate 
functions. For such a system to work, of course, the actors whose conduct is being 
regulated must be at  least partially ignorant of the dual system-some degree of 
"acoustic separation" must exist. Under my system of formulation selection, a law- 
maker could consider the practicability and desirability of separate laws for guiding 
adjudications and for guiding conduct when reconciling the competing goals of ap- 
propriate adjudications and appropriate conduct guidance. 
71. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at  260. 
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the cases that are likely to come before the law administrators 
for adjudication. By appropriate outcome, I mean an  outcome 
that would have been preferred by the lawmaker if the law- 
maker had been adjudicating on a case-by-case basis without 
reference to rules or their possible benefits, omniscient as to 
facts, and possessed of the quality of discretion that it deems 
most perfe~t. '~ 
Obviously, no formulation will yield one hundred percent 
appropriate results. Given that  f a d  finding is imperfect and 
costly and that discretion is not always exercised in a perfect 
manner, the optimum formulation for adjudication is one that 
will minimize the costs related to: (1) incorrect judgments 
resulting from mistakes in the application of discretion; (2) 
incorrect judgments resulting from errors in the fact-finding 
process; (3) incorrect judgments resulting from incongruity 
between the formulation of the law and its underlying social 
and legal norms; and (4) administration. 
a. Mistakes in the application of discretion. When a law- 
maker chooses a formulation for a given social or legal norm 
that accords the law administrator discretion in its application, 
it is not always because the lawmaker is indifferent about how 
the individual cases should be resolved. To the contrary, the 
lawmaker may be very interested in the ultimate resolution of 
each and every case that is decided under the law. The law- 
maker may have a definite sense of the right way and the 
wrong way to resolve each case. The only reason such a law- 
maker may fail to make the proper resolution of each case clear 
to the law administrator is that i t  is difficult to articulate a full 
set of rules that applies to every set of circumstances. The 
lawmaker understands that it is impossible to anticipate every 
possible factual circumstance and therefore is forced to cede, 
however reluctantly, certain discretion to the law administrator 
and hope for the best. 
Herein lies one of the major considerations for the lawmak- 
er. The further the lawmaker moves in the direction of a stan- 
dard, the greater the level of discretion accorded to the law 
administrator. The greater the level of discretion accorded to 
72. Lawmakers may wish that their own sense of the appropriate exercise of 
discretion be reflected in the law administrator's decision or they may prefer that 
some other entity's, such as the community's, sense of the appropriate exercise of 
discretion be the yardstick against which the administrator's performance is mea- 
sured. 
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the law administrator, the greater the likelihood the law 
administrator will make an error.73 
It is not difficult to see how discretionary errors might hap- 
pen in the application of the laches standard. If the law 
requires the judge sitting in equity to determine whether a 
plaintiffs delay in bringing a lawsuit was unreasonable under 
all the circumstances, certainly there will be disagreements 
over what constitutes unreasonable delay. Should a person 
with a debilitating, chronic illness but a clear mind be excused 
for the failure to bring a lawsuit? Reasonable minds will dis- 
agree. Should a person who has been misled by a well-meaning 
but meddling third party into believing that he has no cause of 
action be allowed to proceed when he finally brings a lawsuit 
that would otherwise be considered unreasonably delayed? The 
possibility of exactly such issues arising and being incorrectly 
decided (from the point of view of the lawmaker) is exactly 
what must be considered when determining whether to use 
standards in the formulation of a particular law. At least with 
honest  error^,'^ the further one proceeds towards the standard 
73. There are a number of varieties of error (from the point of view of the law- 
maker) that can occur when a law administrator exercises discretion to decide an 
issue governed by standards. Only some of them can be categorized as honest 
disagreements between lawmaker and law administrator. These good-faith errors, 
however, are the ones expected to increase the more standardlike a law formula- 
tion becomes. Others kinds of errors, however, are the result of cheating by the 
administrator. Such an administrator purports to apply the discretionary standard 
when in f ad  the administrator is going outside the standard. The cheating phe- 
nomenon can arise in four situations. In the first, the administrator attempts to 
reach the result preferred by the lawmaker if the lawmaker were personally adju- 
dicating the matter and actually achieves that result. In the second, the admin- 
istrator attempts to reach the result preferred by the lawmaker if the lawmaker 
were personally adjudicating the matter but misperceives that result. In the third, 
the administrator attempts to reach a result contrary to that yielded by an honest 
application of discretion and actually reaches an unintended result. Finally, in the 
fourth situation, the administrator attempts to reach a result contrary to that 
yielded by an honest application of discretion but actually achieves an intended 
result. 
Only the results of the second and third scenarios are errors, at least when 
one looks a t  the short-term picture. When computing short-term costs, only these 
short-term results count. Unlike honest errors, however, one can expect certain 
cheating errors (the first and possibly the second scenarios) to increase in incidence 
the more rulelike the formulation becomes. This is because the number of occasions 
on which the administrator perceives that the all-things-considered result will differ 
from the result indicated by the law will increase as the law becomes more rule- 
like. 
74. See supra note 73. 
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end of the rule-standard continuum, the greater the likelihood 
of error in the application of discretion. 
b. Mistakes in fact f nding. The possibility of mistakes in 
fact finding is another cost of standards. The further one pro- 
ceeds towards standards on the rule-standard continuum, the 
more facts are put into issue and the more difficult it becomes 
to resolve the factual issues. Errors in factual resolution thus 
become more likely. Sometimes this will cause entire cases to 
be incorrectly decided. Under those circumstances, the subtlety 
of analysis made possible by the use of standards backfires just 
as effectively as if the judge had erred in the application of 
discretion. 
Rules are parsimonious in their consideration of facts. The 
more rulelike a formulation of a given concern is, the fewer the 
facts that will be relevant in applying that law and the easier 
they will be to resolve. Consequently, fewer factual errors will 
occur. 
Statutes of limitation, at least when applied formalistical- 
ly, tend to involve the adjudication of only a handful of easily- 
resolved facts. Although errors will occasionally occur (and 
when they do they are very likely to gffect the outcome of the 
case) they will be relatively rare. Laches, on the other hand, 
requires a very broad investigation of facts-including such 
difEcult-to-resolve facts as what the plaintiff knew and when 
she knew it. Errors in fact finding that affect the outcome of 
the case are bound to be numerous. 
c. Inconsistency between the formulation of a law and its 
underlying legal norm. This is the other side of the coin: the 
cost of rules. As one reduces underlying legal norms t o  simpler, 
more rigid rulelike formulations, there is an increasing poten- 
tial for incorrect judgments-judgments that would not reflect 
the lawmaker's preferences had the lawmaker adjudicated the 
case personally on an all-things-considered basis without 
regard to rules or their benefits over time. The rigidity of rules 
creates errors. 
For example, a rulelike statute of limitations will always 
be both underinclusive and overin~lusive.'~ It will never be a 
perfect reflection of its underlying policies. Suppose, for 
example, legislators take the position that every plaintiff 
should have a reasonable period within which to bring a 
75. See sources cited supra note 9. 
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lawsuit. The legislature promulgates that legal norm in the 
form of a rigid three-year statute of limitations. Sometimes, a 
potential plaintiff may purposely wait until the last opportuni- 
ty to bring a lawsuit before the limitations period has expired 
because he knows that evidence valuable to the potential defen- 
dant will disappear. A rigid rule for time barring actions would 
work an injustice here. It would be underinclusive in that it 
bars fewer actions than justice would require. On other occa- 
sions, a plaintiff may have a perfectly reasonable explanation 
for being unable to bring a lawsuit within the time specified by 
the statute, and the delay may have worked no harm upon the 
defendant. To bar such an action would not promote the stated 
underlying policies of the legislators who adopted it. The rule is 
thus overinclusive, barring more actions than necessary. 
The doctrine of laches does not present the same problem. 
Its flexibility allows the judge sitting in equity the discretion 
necessary to avoid such errors. 
d. Administrative costs. Finally, the gathering and pre- 
sentation of evidence is not an inexpensive enterprise, as every 
litigant knows.76 Neiter is it cheap to maintain a judicial sys- 
tem that must analyze and make a decision on that evidence. 
Courthouses must be built, furnished, and maintained; judges 
and staff paid; and jurors taken away from their routines. 
These are costs that must be taken into account in determining 
where along the rule-standard continuum to formulate a given 
law. If a change in the law does not yield any, or only a few, 
appropriate results while greatly increasing the costs of 
adjudication, then such a change is no bargain and should be 
rejected. 
Ordinarily, the further one moves towards standards on 
the rule-standard continuum, the greater the associated admin- 
istrative cost. The doctrine of laches, which shrouds little or 
nothing from the judge's consideration, is more likely to involve 
significant administrative costs than the statute of limitations. 
Legal issues presented by statutes of limitation are more likely 
t o  be disposed of summarily. 
Any individual lawmaker must weigh these costs with the 
various possibilities of error outlined above to arrive at the 
76. I discuss administrative costs only in the context of the ability of a formu- 
lation to guide law administrators to achieve appropriate case outcomes in adjudi- 
cations. Of course, administrative costs must also be taken into consideration in 
evaluating the formulation's ability to guide actors towards appropriate conduct. 
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formulation most appropriate to guide adjudication. With this, 
however, the lawmaker's job has just begun. In addition, the 
lawmaker must consider whether a given formulation can 
function as an appropriate guide for conduct. 
2. Guiding conduct 
In addition t o  considering the formulation's ability to 
achieve appropriate adjudicative results, a lawmaker must con- 
sider the effect that formulation will have on the future behav- 
ior of the regulated actors. After all, law is not simply a tool for 
resolving disputes that exist autonomously from the law. Law 
affects behavior; people change their activities in response to 
it.77 
One of the virtues of standards in this regard is that they 
discourage brinkmanship. Because it is never clear exactly how 
a particular case will be resolved, those attempting to avoid 
trouble with the law will not "push it to the limit." People can- 
no t  rely upon t h e  technical  overinclusiveness or 
underinclusiveness of a rule to protect them when they are 
engaged in an all-things-considered undesirable activity.78 In 
contrast, the equal and opposite virtue of rules is that they per- 
mit brinkmanship. Because rules are easier to predict, actors 
are in a better position to plan their behavior with confidence. 
The key, of course, is knowing when to encourage brink- 
manship and when to discourage it. For certain situations, pro- 
viding predictable rules will serve no beneficial purpose. The 
kinds of activities that will be fostered, if any, will not be valu- 
able. For other, perhaps most, situations providing a safe har- . 
bor for actors may encourage them both to avoid prohibited 
activities and to engage in associated beneficial activities. Soci- 
ety benefits from the creation of such a safe h a r b ~ r . ' ~  An obvi- 
ous example is commercial activity. Rulelike formulations often 
provide the kind of certainty that will ultimately encourage 
beneficial commercial activity. Before an entrepreneur will sink 
resources into a new enterprise, she will want to know whether 
her contemplated activities are permitted by law. If the penalty 
for violating the law is severe enough, any significant doubt 
77. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 147-56 (2d ed. 1980) 
(making similar distinction between laws governing adjudication and laws govern- 
ing conduct); Dan-Cohen, supra note 70. 
78. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 1695-96; Schlag, supra note 45, at 384-85. 
79. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 262; Schlag, supra note 45, at 384. 
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may lead the entrepreneur to cancel the new enterprise com- 
pletely-hardly a beneficial result. For example, laws with 
severe penalties for selling drugs that are "injurious to the pub- 
lic health" may discourage commerce in pharmaceuticals alto- 
gether. Merchants may refrain from selling pharmaceuticals 
that most believe to be highly beneficial (such as antibiotics) if 
a minority believes otherwise. Such a standard would function 
as a distinctly poor guide for conduct. In contrast, a more rule- 
like formulation, such as a prohibition against the sale of hero- 
in and cocaine, might work quite 
On the other hand, standardlike formulations may be 
appropriate in other areas of the law. For example, a law pro- 
tecting domestic pets from cruelty could spell out in excruciat- 
ing detail precisely what kind of activity is prohibited or it 
could simply prohibit cruelty to domestic pets. At least from the 
standpoint of affecting primary behavior, it seems unlikely that 
the rulelike formulation would have any substantial benefit. 
Ordinarily, responsible pet owners don't engage in any activity 
that is even remotely close to the line, so the need for rulelike 
certainty is minimal. Only miscreants would be interested in 
having a bright-line rule to skate close to. 
How does all this apply to limitations policy? The primary 
argument for the use of rules is that it encourages potential 
defendants t o  feel secure enough to engage in worthwhile activ- 
ities once the limitations period has passed. A bright-line rule 
allows a person who has been tying up resources in anticipa- 
tion of being sued to release those resources into productive 
use. For example, in cases that involve disputes over the own- 
ership of real estate, it is hardly surprising that the potential 
defendant in possession would be reluctant to invest heavily in 
improving the property if he or she feels it may soon be lost. 
Even in cases that do not involve disputes over specific items of 
property, it is not surprising that a potential defendant would 
be inclined to refrain from the most productive use of assets in 
favor of a less vulnerable position. Why should anyone invest a 
lifetime of savings and effort into a new Italian restaurant if 
there is a significant risk that it will be taken in execution of a 
judgment? It is better to spend the money on a vacation to 
Italy and eat Italian food prepared by someone else. 
80. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 9, at 262; Schlag, supra note 45, at 384. 
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The effect on plaintiffs may be less significant. From the 
standpoint of the plaintiff, the benefit of having a rigid rule, 
such as it is, lies primarily in allowing for amicable settlements 
when otherwise the anxious potential plaintiff might be forced 
to file a law suit for fear of being time barred. The harm lies 
primarily in the risk that plaintiffs will wait until the last min- 
ute to file an action in hopes that the defendant's evidence will 
disappear or that the defendant will be inconvenienced by the 
uncertainty entailed by the extra wait. The possibility of such 
behavior being a double-edged sword serves to lessen the likeli- 
hood of such abuse. 
Consequently, bringing the ability of a limitations for- 
mulation to serve as a guide for conduct into the lawmaker's 
calculus will mainly influence the lawmaker in the direction of 
rules. 
3. The relative importance of directing adjudication and guid- 
ing conduct 
Once a lawmaker has decided which formulations will 
achieve the most appropriate case outcomes and which will be 
most effective in encouraging appropriate conduct, the lawmak- 
er must decide how to reconcile the goals. 
The balance the lawmaker strikes will no doubt vary 
according to the subject matter of the laws. The key is simply 
that the person who strikes the balance must attempt to do so 
from an unbiased vantage point. The lawmaker must not favor 
one goal over the other for reasons of self interest. Instead, the 
lawmaker's views should reflect a mature judgment about the 
degree to which a given formulation will yield appropriate adju- 
dicative results, the degree to which that formulation will guide 
appropriate conduct, and the relative importance of each." 
4. Attracting consensus 
To the extent that the lawmaker is not one unfettered indi- 
vidual with a single mind about the policies he or she is 
attempting to pursue, the choice along the rule-standard con- 
tinuum will also be influenced by the need to obtain the level of 
consensus necessary to promulgate a law.s2 
81. See infra part II.D.l-2. 
82. See JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITIJTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
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The more standardlike a law becomes, the more transpar- 
ent it is with regard to the underlying legal principle or princi- 
ples that it is designed to implement. If the members of a legis- 
lature or other body authorized to promulgate laws cannot 
agree on the underlying principles that should animate the law 
they promulgate, they should not look to standards. Standards 
cannot build consensus. Rules, on the other hand, by virtue of 
the fact that they can often be accounted for by any number of 
underlying legal principles, will often receive the support of 
otherwise warring factions within the lawmaking body. Conse- 
quently, they may be the only choices available. 
Limitations law makes for an excellent example. An indi- 
vidual can take several approaches to the subject: one favoring 
plaintiffs, one favoring defendants, or a balance of the two. One 
can take the position that no lawsuit should be barred until the 
plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to bring it. Only 
then should courts begin to contemplate whether to bar an 
action as untimely (and perhaps only then if the defendant has 
actually been harmed). One can focus on the defendant's pre- 
dicament by maintaining that no lawsuit should be allowed 
after the defendant, through no fault of her own, has suffered a 
loss of evidence or other loss to a particular defense regardless 
of whether the plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to 
bring the case. In the alternative, one can attempt to balance 
the competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants through 
the use of some formula. These are policy choices that logically 
precede the lawmaker's choice of the point along the rule-stan- 
dard continuum. 
The doctrine of laches cannot hide its sympathy with the 
plaintiff-focused position described above. In order for a defen- 
dant t o  prevail on a laches defense, he must show both that the 
plaintiff delayed unreasonably in bringing the lawsuit and that 
he has been harmed by this delay. Hence, only cases in which 
the plaintiff has had a reasonable opportunity to bring the 
action can be time barred. A supporter of the defendant-focused 
position would have a difficult time casting a vote in favor of 
the laches doctrine. Such a supporter could, on the other hand, 
cast a vote in favor of a statute of limitations. A statute of 
limitations does not identify its supporters so readily as propo- 
nents of the plaintiff-focused, the defendant-focused, or the 
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 276-77 (1990); see also Symposium, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 167-518 (1988) (discussing the theory of public choice). 
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mixed position. All such persons might be willing to support it 
as a "compromise" position. Most of the time it will produce 
results consistent with all three approaches. Occasionally, 
though, i t  will produce results inconsistent with one, two, or 
even all three approaches. It will not, however, systematically 
favor one approach to the exclusion of the others. In that sense, 
it is a compromise. 
D. The Divergent Paths of the Statute of Limitations 
and Laches 
Assuming that actual lawmakers have considered the fore- 
going, one is led t o  question what accounts for the divergence 
in limitations policy between law and equity. Several possible 
explanations come to mind. 
1. The relative ability of the two approaches to guide adjudi- 
cation 
It  would make sense for individual legislators to favor a 
relatively rulelike limitations device to adjudicate cases a t  law. 
At the same time, however, it would make sense for those same 
individuals, if given a seat upon an appellate court, to favor a 
more standardlike limitations device in adjudicating equity 
cases. There are a t  least three interrelated reasons for this. 
First, the case load has traditionally been regarded as more 
homogeneous a t  law than a t  equity and hence better governed 
by rules. Second, the adjudicators of cases at law (judges and 
jurors) tend to be regarded as heterogeneous and not as 
inclined as equity adjudicators (judges sitting in equity) to 
reflect the same values as  the lawmakers who issue directives 
to them. Third, the mechanisms available to a legislator to cor- 
rect courts that have, in the legislator's view, incorrectly decid- 
ed a case are very limited. Unlike the appellate court judge, the 
legislator cannot simply reverse a bad decision. Hence, legisla- 
tors may be more inclined to put adjudicators on a short leash 
than they would if they were appellate court judges deciding 
how much discretion to vest in trial judges deciding equity 
cases. 
a. The degree of homogeneity in case loads. The first pos- 
sible explanation for the existence of the two very different 
approaches to limitations lies in the degree of homogeneity in 
the groups of cases to which they are applied. Relatively homo- 
geneous cases can be governed efficiently by a rulelike 
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formulation of a legal prin~iple.'~ The variations in the fact 
patterns presented are such that a relatively rigid rule can be 
fashioned that will produce unfortunate case outcomes only 
rarely. The more heterogeneous the case load becomes, the 
greater the need for standards. 
Is it in fact true that traditional actions at law were rela- 
tively homogeneous and trachtional equity cases were relatively 
heterogene~us?'~ Certainly, the conventional answer to that 
question would be yes. The history of the common law is rooted 
in the notion that cases at law can be categorized in one of only 
a handful of forms of action. Within each category, the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the cases were thought to be 
sufficiently similar to justify the application of the same pro- 
cedure. 
On the other hand, equity cases were, in theory at least, 
the oddball cases. They were the square pegs that did not fit 
the round holes available in the law courts. If traditional equi- 
ty courts were not truly dealing with exceptional cases, there 
would be little justification for having such courts. Given this 
traditional view, it hardly seems surprising that a lawmaker 
would choose t o  apply a rulelike statute of limitations to 
actions at law and a standardlike laches doctrine to actions in 
equity. If actions at law are generally homogeneous and equity 
cases generally heterogeneous, they are probably less so with 
regard to the application of limitations law. 
The degree of contrast between law and equity is probably 
accentuated when viewed through the eyes of the relevant law- 
makers. For example, legislators drafting statutes for common 
law courts are often aloof from the day-to-day business of 
83. This is necessarily true because when I designate a given group of cases 
relatively homogeneous, I mean nothing other than homogeneous with respect to 
those characteristics that are relevant to a decision maker engaging in particularis- 
tic decision making. There are relatively few cases that do not fit the usual pat- 
tern. Consequently, there are relatively few cases that would be decided incorrectly 
if a rigid rule were applied to them. 
84. I t  is questionable whether the underlying facts of traditional law cases were 
bland and homogeneous and the fads of equity cases exceptional. Perhaps law 
cases only seemed unexceptional because the procedure traditionally used to adjudi- 
cate these cases, the jury trial, was so cumbersome that law courts tended towards 
regimenting procedures that obscured the true range of facts that came before 
them. This can be contrasted with equity procedures, where jury trials were un- 
available. A good example is the stylized pleading rules used at common law. If 
the underlying facts of the cases brought under those pleading rules appeared to 
be bland and homogeneous, it is only because the pleading rules forced them into 
such a mold. 
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adjudication and thus may be unfamiliar with the courts' case 
load. They may be tempted to oversimplify or to presume incor- 
rectly that any set of cases with which they are unfamiliar 
must be less complex and diverse than i t  really is. This aspect 
of human nature intensifies the tendency towards rulelike 
formulations for application to actions a t  law. No similar lack 
of familiarity exists for equity cases. Originally, the lawmaker 
was the chancellor, who would have been intimately familiar 
with equity cases. When appellate courts inherited the function 
of lawmaker, the intimate familiarity with equity cases was 
inherited as well. The likelihood of overestimating the homoge- 
neity of the cases is small. Instead, the danger is the opposite: 
losing sight of the forest on account of all the trees. 
This parallels the contrast between Solomon and Solon. 
Solomon was dealing with a single case. I t  is not clear how 
many custody battles he had to decide during his reign, but i t  
seems unlikely that the case recounted in the Bible was a 
routine one. In any event, given the size of his empire, he 
probably &d not take the time to decide ordinary cases. These 
could be decided by ministers applying his rules. As king, he 
probably concentrated his efforts on the extraordinary cases, 
much the same way equity courts were thought to do. Solon's 
codes, on the other hand, were intended to govern all the cases 
that arose in Athens, the vast majority of which were likely to 
be quite commonplace. Consequently, like the legislators pas- 
sing statutes to govern actions a t  law, Solon tended to for- 
mulate his laws as rules. 
b. The law administrator's trustworthiness. A closely 
related difference between law and equity is the identity of the 
adjudicator. The importance of this factor should be clear. 
Adjudicators who are perceived by the lawmaker to be relative- 
ly homogeneous, to share the lawmaker's basic values, and to 
be capable fact finders need not be reined in by rules. On the 
other hand, control must be exerted over untrustworthy adjudi- 
cators. We have already seen this a t  work in the contrast 
between Solomon and Solon. Solomon was his own adjudicator 
and thus felt perfectly comfortable in ceding complete authority 
to himself. Solon, whose adjudicators were presumably mem- 
bers of the warring factions that made up Athenian society a t  
the time, had to rely on rules. 
How does this help explain why a rulelike limitations law 
developed for actions a t  law and a standardlike one for equity 
cases? A fundamental distinction between traditional courts of 
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equity and courts of law was the jury. Equity courts, of course, 
had no juries.85 All decisions, whether on facts, law, or mixed 
issues of fact and law, had to be made by the chancellor him- 
self or, later, by professional judges. Courts of law, in contrast, 
used juries as fact finders and as arbiters of certain 
discretionary matters such as the existence of negligence? 
How would the legislatures that enacted statutes of limita- 
tion have perceived adjudicators in law courts? How would the 
equity chancellors and appellate courts who instituted and 
refined the laches doctrine have perceived those who adjudicate 
equity cases? The chancellor likely felt a great deal more com- 
fortable vesting power and discretion in the equity adjudicators 
than Parliament did vesting power and discretion in the law 
adjudicators. Originally, the chancellor was his own 
adjudicator. Like Solomon, he could be completely assured of 
an adjudicator who would share his values. When equity 
expanded t o  include equity judges, the chancellor had every 
reason to  believe these judges shared his outlook on life. If 
nothing else, they tended to  share with him a legal education of 
one sort or another and a background in the practice of law. 
Legislatures enacting laws for common-law courts had no 
similar assurance that their adjudicators would be kindred 
spirits. Little evidence exists to show that the typical eigh- 
teenth-century juror had a lot in common with the typical eigh- 
teenth-century legislat~r.~' 
85. Although litigants had no right to trial by jury in equity courts, such courts 
have traditionally had the authority to convene advisory juries. See 5 JAMES W. 
MOORE El' AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 39.10 (2d ed. 1992). See also FED. R. 
CIv. P. 39(c) (preserving this authority for federal courts acting in equity); Note, 
Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1363 (1987). 
86. The distinction is crucial because it made equity courts possible. Without it, 
the English dual system of justice could never have evolved. The extensive powers 
of the equity courts, which go far beyond the mere award of legal damages, would 
never have been permitted to develop had the power been lodged primarily in the 
hands of nonprofessional juries. 
87. In the eighteenth century, English jurors were adult males subject to a 
statutory property qualification. In 1693, this was set at  ten pounds a year for 
English juries and six pounds a year for juries in Wales. GEES DUNCOMB, TRIALS 
PER PAIS: OR, THE LAW OF ENGLAND CONCERNING JURIES BY NISI ~ J S  91-92 
(photo. reprint 1980) (1725). These requirements remained in effect at  least until 
midcentury, with only a few regional variations. For the city of London, in 1730, a 
hundred-pound qualification was imposed. 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 19 (1730) (Eng.). In 
Middlesex, where leaseholding was apparently common, men possessing leaseholds 
worth ffiy pounds per year were qualified to serve on juries. 4 Geo. 2, ch. 7, 8 3 
(1731) (Eng.). 
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One thing is for certain: The jurors of the eighteenth 
century were certainly not the elite of English society. Indeed, 
an eighteenth century commentator described the petty jurors 
at assizes as 'low and ignorant country people."" 
88. MAKTIN MADAN, THOUGHTS ON EXECUTIVE JUSTICE, WITH RESPECT TO THE 
CRIMINAL AWS, PARTIC~TLARLY ON ITS CIRCUITS (2d ed. 1785). 
Opinions varied tremendously, just as they do today, concerning the desirability 
of the jury system. In 1956, Lord Devlin, speaking in the Eighth Hamlyn Lecture 
Series, offered this defense of juries: 
Each jury is a little parliament. The jury sense is the parliamentary 
sense. I c a ~ o t  see the one dying and the other surviving. The first object 
of any tyrant in Whitehall would be to make Parliament utterly subservi- 
ent to his will; and next to overthrow or diminish trial by jury, for no 
tyrant could afford to leave a subject's freedom in the hands of twelve of 
his countrymen. So that trial by jury is more than an instrument of jus- 
tice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that 
shows that freedom lives. 
PATRICK DEVGN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956). 
In contrast, one year earlier, a t  the Seventh Series of Hamlyn Lectures, Glan- 
ville Williams stated: 
If one proceeds by the light of reason, there seems to be a formidable 
weight of argument against the jury system. To begin with, the twelve 
men and women are chosen haphazard. There is a slight property qualifi- 
cation-too slight to be used as an index of ability, if indeed the mere 
possession of property can ever be so used; on the other hand, exemption 
is given to some professional people who would seem to be among the 
best qualified to serve--clergymen, ministers of religion, lawyers, doctors, 
dentists, chemists, justices of the peace (as well as all ranks of the armed 
forces). The subtraction of relatively intelligent classes means that it is an 
understatement to describe a jury, with Herbert Spencer, as a group of 
twelve people of average ignorance. There is no guarantee that members 
of a particular jury may not be quite unusually ignorant, credulous, slow- 
witted, narrowminded, biased or temperamental. The danger of this hap- 
pening is not one that can be removed by some minor procedural adjust- 
ment; it is inherent in the English notion of a jury as a body chosen 
from the general population a t  random. 
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 271-72 (3d ed. 1963). 
One need look no further than our own founding fathers for a similar di- 
vergence of opinion. In the heady days of the American Revolution up to the r a t s -  
cation of the Constitution, one would expect antijury sentiment to be relatively 
rare. Yet that is exactly the sentiment expressed by Alexander Hamilton in The 
Federalist No. 83. In it, Hamilton expresses reservations about the wisdom of vest- 
ing juries (as opposed to judges) with the authority to decide questions of fact in 
equity cases. According t o  Hamilton, such a change in procedure "will tend gradu- 
ally to change the nature of the courts . . . by introducing questions too complicat- 
ed for a decision in that mode." THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at  570 (Alexander Hamil- 
ton) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1961). 
Jefferson took the contrary position. Apparently convinced that the use of juries 
yielded a superior method of adjudicating cases, Jefferson advocated their use as 
f a d  finders in all kinds of cases. In a proposed Constitution for the Commonwealth 
of Virginia authored by Jefferson, he urged that "[alll facts in causes, whether of 
Chancery, Common, Ecclesiastic, or Marine law, shall be tried by jury." THOMAS 
948 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
The point here is simply that any lawmaker would have 
been able to recognize the heterogeneity of juries, the risk that 
they might not share the lawmaker's values, and the risk that 
they might be incompetent fact finders. Consequently, any 
legislature promulgating a statute of limitations had plenty of 
reason to prefer a rulelike formulation if it was seeking to 
maximize appropriate adjudications. 
c. Ability to correct the law administrator's errors. The 
lawmaker's ability to correct errors of the law administrator is 
another important factor to consider when deciding between 
the two approaches to limitations law. Unlike equity lawmak- 
ers, the legislature loses control once the law is enacted and a 
case presents itself for adjudication. If the legislature is dissat- 
isfied with the law court's resolution of the case, it can change 
the statute but it can do little or nothing to change the outcome 
of a case. The same was never true in equity. Certainly, no loss 
of control occurred when the chancellor was both lawmaker and 
adjudicator. Later, of course, equity became more institutional- 
ized. Eventually appellate courts became the equity lawmakers 
and lower courts the adjudicators. Even so, the lawmakers 
remain in position to reassert control over an individual case 
through the appeals process. When and if an appeal is made, 
the appellate court may correct any errors the lower court has 
committed in interpreting the standard. Thus, it can better 
afford the luxury of vesting discretion in law administrators 
through standards. 
Hence all three reasons discussed-the homogeneity of 
cases, the identity and perceived trustworthiness of jurors, and 
the lack of mechanisms to correct erroneous decisions-tend to 
move legislators enacting statutes that will govern law cases in 
the direction of rules. 
2. Ability to guide conduct 
The lawmaker's desire to guide conduct can also account, 
at least in part, for the divergence between the two approaches 
to  limitations. Even if the guidance of conduct, rather than the 
guidance of adjudication, is at issue, a legislator would have 
reason to prefer a rulelike device for cases at law. If the same 
JEFFERSON, A Bill for Re-Moddling the Form of Government and for Establishing 
the Fundamental Principle Thereof in Future, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFER- 
SON 362 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
9 171 A STUDY IN THE CHOICE OF FORM 949 
legislator were given a seat on an  appellate court, however, he 
or she would have reason to prefer a more standardlike device 
to govern equity. 
Some areas of law demand rulelike treatment or standard- 
like treatment not because such formulations produce better 
adjudication, but because they produce better behavior. For 
example, Solomon dealt with a question of family law-an area 
particularly well-suited to standards. In theory a t  least, family 
law governs situations in which actors are not likely to conform 
their conduct to the intricacies of a rule of law. Solon's rules, on 
the other hand, applied to, among other things, commercial 
law, an area in which more rulelike formulations are thought 
to be necessary. 
How does this explain the difference in limitations policy 
between law and equity? As discussed earlier, laws have two 
very distinct  function^.^' First, they provide rules of conduct 
to which members of the public conform their behavior. A good 
law, from this standpoint, is one that best influences such per- 
sons to act appropriately. Second, laws provide rules for courts 
to follow in deciding cases. A good law from this standpoint is 
one that best enables the court applying it to dispose of cases 
in a just and fair manner. 
Although we ordinarily think that the same law must ful- 
fill both functions, the principle of acoustic separation suggests 
that this is neither necessary nor optimal.g0 The two functions 
will often conflict. For example, a very rigid statute of limita- 
tions may be the best law for inducing potential plaintiffs to 
file their lawsuits promptly. Frightened into believing they will 
lose their cause of action if they do not file immediately and 
knowing that no amount of bellyaching over so-called special 
circumstances will do them any good, many potential plaintiffs 
will file promptly, believing they must. Moreover, such a rule 
will almost certainly be best for persuading potential defen- 
dants to undertake socially beneficial activities that they would 
not otherwise undertake without assurances that their poten- 
tial liability has been extinguished. Nevertheless, a rigid rule 
may be much less effective as a rule of decision than it is as  a 
rule of conduct. A more lenient law allowing for special circum- 
89. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 70. 
90. See id. 
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stances may yield an increased number of appropriate out- 
comess1 in adjudication. 
If a wall of silence could be erected between a rigid statute 
of limitations as a rule of conduct and a more lenientlacheslike 
rule of decision, one could enjoy the best of both worlds, or so 
the argument runs.92 The problem is that the separation 
between a rule of conduct and a rule of decision can never be 
complete. Members of the public are sure to find out that, when 
it comes to decisions, the rigid statute of limitations is in f a d  
quite lenient. That, of course, will affect the degree to which 
they can rely on the law and conform their behavior to it. So 
long as the public's knowledge of the truth is imperfect, how- 
ever, some benefit can be derived from a dual system. 
The division between law and equity can in part be 
explained by the concept of acoustic s e p a r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  In general, 
the common law is considerably more familiar to both lay per- 
sons and their attorneys than is equity. I t  should not come as a 
surprise, therefore, that laws applying to actions a t  law tend to 
be somewhat more rulelike than laws applying to cases in equi- 
ty 
This tendency includes limitations law. Members of the 
public are more likely to be acquainted with the statute of 
limitations than the doctrine of laches. Hence, the public is 
more likely to use the statute of limitations as a guide for con- 
duct than they are to use laches. Of course, the statute of limi- 
tations is not solely a rule of conduct; however, the public's 
reliance on it as a guide for conduct will have some incremental 
effect on its formulation. 
The doctrine of laches, on the other hand, is primarily an 
adjudication guide. Since members of the public are less likely 
to be aware of it and thus to attempt to conform their behavior 
to it, the doctrine can afford to be somewhat more standardlike 
than the statute of limitations. A court adopting the laches doc- 
trine need not be as fearful of the effect the doctrine will have 
on the primary behavior of potential litigants as the legislature 
adopting a statute of limitations for law cases. It can be secure 
91. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
92. See Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 M D .  L. 
REV. 253 (1991) (discussing the principle of acoustic separation in the context of 
law and equity). 
93. See id. 
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in the knowledge that, at least to  some degree, courts sitting in 
equity operate outside the public consciousness. 
3. Ability to develop consensus among lawmakers 
So far I have been seeking explanations for why a rational 
individual might choose t o  apply a rulelike formulation of a 
limitations principle to actions at law but a standardlike for- 
mulation to equity cases. Practical politics may be one explana- 
tion for the existence of this rule-standard pair governing limi- 
tations. The statute of limitations is first and foremost a stat- 
ute, the product of a legislative body. The laches doctrine, on 
the other hand, is the product of equity chancellors and courts. 
Because legislatures are ordinarily made up of large num- 
bers of individuals, they may be more prone than courts--cer- 
tainly more prone than a single chancellor-to promulgate 
rules. In order to forge a coalition necessary to enact a law, 
conflicts among legislators regarding the appropriate underly- 
ing legal norm must be subordinated to  the task at hand: 
enacting some sort of limitations law. Resorting to rules, which 
by their nature do not put the legislature on record as advocat- 
ing one approach or another, is the obvious strategy to take. In 
equity, where consensus is easier to achieve, no similar tenden- 
cy towards rules will exist. 
None of this has any bearing on whether the statute ulti- 
mately enacted by a legislature will be a good law if judged by 
its ability to function as an appropriate guide for adjudication 
or for conduct. Nevertheless, it is important because without 
the consensus of legislators no law can be promulgated. Addi- 
tionally, without some level of confidence on the part of legisla- 
tors that their compromises will be upheld by courts, no future 
compromises can occur. 
4. Systemtic diflerences in the perspectives of legislators and 
judges 
Finally, the possibility exists that two different lawmakers 
might adopt strikingly different limitations formulations 
because they have strikingly different views of what constitutes 
appropriate limitations policy specifically or of the value of 
rules and standards generally. 
Self-interest may drive judges to favor standards. Unlike 
legislators, judges resolve individual disputes for a living. The 
importance of law as a guide for adjudication as contrasted 
952 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
with its importance as a guide for conduct is thus bound to 
loom large for them. 
Each judge knows that his or her decisions will be evaluat- 
ed both for their quality as instruments of adjudication and for 
their effectiveness in guiding conduct. The effect any particular 
decision might have on an adjudication, however, is direct and 
obvious: the decision is the adjudication. It will often be dispos- 
itive in resolving a lawsuit. The public will perceive the judge 
as having correctly decided the case or they will perceive the 
judge as having decided it incorrectly. Whatever costs or 
benefits to reputation that accrue as a result of the 
adjudication will accrue almost fully to  the judge or judges who 
have decided the case. It is easy for the public to connect the 
judge or judges to a particular case. On the other hand, the 
connection between any particular decision and its effect on 
future conduct is much more indirect and tenuous. Conduct will 
ordinarily be guided not by one judge's opinion, but by a cluster 
of opinions in the same area of the law. Consequently, no one 
judge (or panel of judges) can be identified as the source of the 
problem. 
The best strategy for the ambitious judge is thus to  concen- 
trate on developing adjudication guides, not conduct guides. 
That way the judge can fully reap the benefits of being some- 
one who correctly decides cases while free-riding on the efforts 
of other judges to  create laws that are easily interpretable and 
thus helpful to the public as guides for conduct. 
In essence, what we have here is a prisoner's dilemma for 
the judge. The problem is, of course, that if all judges pursue 
this strategy, eventually the law will suffer. The systematic 
overemphasis of law as an adjudicative device will result in bad 
law. 
111. THE MODERN TREND TOWARDS CONVERGENCE OF 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES 
Given the many explanations for the contrasting formula- 
tion of limitations law, it is both interesting and a bit troubling 
that the two approaches are experiencing a noticeable degree of 
convergence. 
With regard to laches, this process has been going on for 
quite some time. By the nineteenth century, American courts 
had lined up behind attempts to limit the discretion of equity 
judges in applying the laches doctrine. These courts held that 
equity judges at the trial level should accept the length of time 
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stated in the analogous statute of limitations as reasonable and 
not deviate from it except in unusual circumstances.s4 The 
laches doctrine thus became more rulelike than before-not a 
surprising result given the increased institutionalization of 
equity courts during that period. Indeed, one would expect that 
as the equity courts became increasingly removed from the 
single chancellor model and more complex and hierarchical as 
an institution, they would turn to more rulelike formulations. 
This trend has continued into the twentieth century.95 In 
situations that require courts to apply the laches doctrine, they 
simply apply the period specified in the most analogous statute 
of limitationsg6 unless unusual or extraordinary circumstances 
dictate other~ise.~' In Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 
the court stated: 
Several reasons underlie the use of the statutory period as 
the laches period. It  enhances the stability and clarity of the 
law by applying neutral principles in an evenhanded fashion 
rather than making the question purely discretionary. It  also 
requires courts to make clear distinctions between threshold 
or special defenses or pleas in bar and the merits of the case. 
It  enhances the rationality and objectivity of the process by 
preventing courts from short circuiting difficult issues on the 
merits by confusing and conflating the merits of an action 
with other defenseseg8 
94. See, e.g., Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U.S. 201 (1878); Wagner v. Baird, 48 U.S. 
(7 How.) 234 (1849); Kelley v. Boettcher, 85 F. 55, 62 (8th Cir. 1898). 
95. See Deudopmnts in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, supra note 29, a t  
1184. 
96. See DeSilvio v. h d e n t i a l  Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983); Goodman 
v. McDomell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 
913 (1980); TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 592 F.2d 346, 348 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986). 
97. The strength of the presumption in favor of the statutory period varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Consequently, the degree to which the laches doc- 
trine is made more rulelike by that presumption varies. But i t  is clear that in 
each such jurisdiction the level of discretion wielded by a judge sitting in equity is 
limited. See Tandy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362, 366 (6th Cir. 
1985) C[I]f the analogous statute of limitation has not elapsed, there is a strong 
presumption that plaintiffs delay in bringing the suit for monetary relief is reason- 
able . . . ."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); Gruca v. United States Steel Corp., 
495 F.2d 1252, 1259 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating that the effect of analogous stat- 
ute of limitations on the application of laches in an equity case is simply to deter- 
mine on which party the burden to demonstrate. unreasonableness should lie); 
Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 F. 35, 40 (8th Cir. 1910) 
(finding that the analogous statute of limitations will be applied to trademark case 
except under hnusual conditions or extraordinary circums&ncesn). 
98. 769 F.2d a t  365. 
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There is, of course, a price to pay for stability and clarity 
in the law. In some cases, limitations on a judge's discretion 
will force unwanted results. Now and then, one will find a case 
that cannot in good faith be classified as extraordinary and yet, 
all things considered, justice would be better served by an out- 
come contrary to that dictated by the analogous statute of limi- 
tations. 
More interesting is the tendency of American courts to 
move the statute of limitations in the direction of the standard- 
like laches doctrine. Traditionally, most statutes of limitations 
have provided that a cause of action would be barred a certain 
number of years after the cause of action accrued.99 Such stat- 
utes did not explicitly allow for a tolling of the limitations 
period based on plaintiffs ignorance of facts suggesting a claim. 
When they explicitly allowed for tolling at  all, they did so for 
infancy, imprisonment, or insanity, but not ignorance.'" Over 
time, this has been changed by court decisions engrafting 
everexpanding discovery rules into statutes of limitation. These 
discovery rules toll the commencement of the limitations period 
when plaintiff is excusably unaware of his or her cause of 
action. 
Through these seemingly minor modifications, the courts 
have achieved a near convergence of the statute of limitations 
and the doctrine of laches. Indeed, some courts have rendered 
them barely distinguishable in practice. lo' 
Prior to the advent of discovery rules, statutes of limitation 
essentially operated like this: A specific length of time was 
selected by the legislature to cover all cases that fell into a par- 
ticular category of substantive law. For example, certain tort 
cases might be barred after three yearslo2 and cases founded 
99. See, eg., 21 Jam. 1, ch. 16 (1623) (Eng.). 
100. See id. 
101. During the nineteenth century, plaintiffs ignorance of his or her cause of 
action was ordinarily insufficient to toll the commencement of a limitations period, 
unless the defendant fraudulently concealed information regarding the cause of ac- 
tion from plaintiff. See, e.g., Distrid Township of Crawford v. Gaulden, 33 Ga. 173 
(1862); Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa 601 (1875); Mast v. Easton, 22 N.W. 253 Wnn.  
1885). The practice of equitably tolling the commencement of a limitations period 
during any period the defendant had fraudulently concealed facts relating to plain- 
tiffs cause of action was well-established even in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., 
Campbell v. Long, 20 Iowa 382 (1866); Garrett v. Conklin, 52 Mo. App. 654, 659 
(1892). 
102. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 600.5805(8) (1991). 
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upon debt arising out of a written contract might be barred 
after six years.lo3 The length of time would be such that most 
(but not all) plaintiffs whose cause of action fell within that 
category of cases would have sufficient time to discover their 
cause of action and file in court. Significantly, however, the 
calculation of the appropriate length of time was done a t  the 
wholesale level. The issue was whether the number of years 
provided by the statute was an adequate length of time for the 
great number of cases, not whether it was adequate in any 
particular case. Because a bright-line limitations rule allowed 
potential defendants to feel secure enough to carry on ordinary, 
productive lives, individualized consideration was thought 
unwise. 
Once an expansive discovery rule was added onto the stat- 
ute of limitations, everything changed. No longer was the calcu- 
lation of the appropriate length of time done wholesale; it was 
individualized. As a consequence, a court must now determine, 
for each cause of action, whether a particular plaintiff has had 
adequate notice of the need to take action. 
This important change in limitations law deserves special 
scrutiny. Equitable doctrines, like laches, were created by 
courts and thus are for the courts to modify. Judicial modifica- 
tion of statutes is something different. When courts modify 
statutes passed by legislatures, it raises a complex set of 
issues. 
The kinds of cases for which courts were originally most 
likely to fashion a discovery rule were those in which the cause 
of action could not be known by the plaintiff. The prototypical 
example is the medical malpractice cases in  which the surgeon 
leaves some undesirable material in the patient after sur- 
gery.lo4 This was often referred to as the foreign object 
rule. lo5 
Later, some jurisdictions expanded the foreign object rule 
to include ordinary medical malpractice, legal malpractice, and 
103. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. 8 657-1 (1985). 
104. See, e.g., Burke v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 293 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1968), 
rev'd on other grounds, 475 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1973); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 
So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954); Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 389 P.2d 224 (Idaho 
1964); Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 417 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 1966); Fernandi v. 
Strully, 173 A.2d 277 (N.J. 1961); Melnyk v. Cleveland Clinic, 290 N.E.2d 916 
(Ohio 1972); Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996 (Or. 1966); Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 
788 (Pa. 1959); Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965). 
105. See, e.g., Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C. 1979). 
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products liability cases in which the plaintiff was neither aware 
of his or her injury nor in the exercise of due diligence should 
the plaintiff have been aware. This rule became known as the 
discovery rule.lo6 
This expansion quickly led to the obvious question: Just 
what is it that has to be discovered in order to trigger the rule? 
Suppose a tort victim is aware of the fact of his or her injury, 
but not that it was caused by the defendant. Suppose the vic- 
tim is not aware of facts indicating that the defendant's con- 
duct was wrongfid (for example, negligent in the case of a 
negligence cause of action). How much information is enough? 
Should the limitations period's commencement be delayed until 
plaintiff is in possession of sufficient facts to  give notice of each 
element of the cause of action? 
A few courts have balked at  extending the discovery rule 
quite so far. Prominent among these is United States v. 
Kubri~k,'~' in which the Supreme Court decided the question 
for cases brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.lo8 In 
Kubrick, plaintiff was given an antibiotic at a veterans' hospital 
that caused him to become partially deaf. The court of appeals 
ruled that 
even though a plaintiff is aware of his injury and of the 
defendant's responsibility for it, the statute of limitations does 
not run where the plaintiff shows that "in the exercise of due 
diligence he did not know, nor should he have known, facts 
which would have alerted a reasonable person to the possibili- 
ty that the treatment was improper."10g 
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that such a rule would 
unduly and unfairly delay the commencement of the limitations 
period. It therefore reversed, holding that a cause of action 
accrues when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its 
cause.110 The Court stated: "[A] plaintiff such as Kubrick, 
106. Id. 
107. 444 U.S. 111 (1979), rev'g 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978). 
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1988). 
109. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted). 
110. Cases decided by federal courts applying state law generally support 
Kubrick. In Timberlake v. A.H. Robins Co., 727 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1984), for 
example, the plaintiff had contracted a pelvic infection and had been told by her 
doctor that her problem was probably caused by her intrauterine contraceptive 
device. She did nothing, however, until three years later, when she saw a televi- 
sion show that indicated her injury may have been the result of the manufacturer's 
negligence. She then filed suit. The court held that despite her lack of knowledge 
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armed with the facts about the harm done to  him, can protect 
himself by seeking advice in the medical and legal community. 
To excuse him from promptly doing so by postponing the accru- 
al of his claim would undermine the purpose of the limitations 
statute . . . ."ll' 
Kubrick and its progeny112 stand for the proposition that 
once a plaintiff is aware of the existence of his or her injury 
and its cause, the limitations period begins to  run regardless of 
whether plaintiff has or should have evidence of negligence or 
other wrongdoing. These cases take the position that the limi- 
tations period prescribed in the statute is the time for a poten- 
tial plaintiff who realizes that he or she has been injured by 
the defendant to  seek whatever evidence he or she needs and 
make a decision whether to bring a lawsuit. The time period is 
rigid and fixed and hence will occasionally work an injustice to  
a plaintiff. Sometimes it will be too short for the plaintiff to  
discover sufficient facts upon which to predicate a cognizable 
claim. But it will provide desirable results more often than an 
approach that vests the trier of fact with the authority to carry 
out the hopeless task of determining whether the plaintiff was 
of the defendant's negligence, her cause of action accrued at the time she learned 
of her infection and its likely cause. At that point, she was on notice to investigate 
the situation within the two-year period allotted by the Texas statute of limita- 
tions. Since she had not done so, the court rendered summary judgment for the 
defendant. 
Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1983), is nearly 
identical to Timberlake. The court held that, under California law, the injured 
party must bring suit within one year of discovering the physical cause of her 
injury. The Court refused to toll the limitations period until the injured party 
learned facts suggesting that the defendant's conduct was tortious. Accord Fidler v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 714 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that the Massachusetts 
statute of limitations began to run on plaintiff, injured as a result of droplets of a 
chemical substance being left in her body after an X-ray, as soon as she was told 
her pain might be caused by these droplets and not later when she learned of 
manufacturer's negligence); Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982) (refusing to extend limitations period on suit 
against manufacturer of allegedly defective vaccine when injured party had known 
all along he had been injured by the vaccine but had only recently learned of early 
test results indicating the vaccine had been unsafe); Pauley v. Combustion Eng'g, 
Inc., 528 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (holding that cause of action of asbesto- 
sis victim accrued when he learned of his injury and its actual cause, not when he 
learned of its legal cause); Bosworth v. Plummer, 510 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D. Pa. 
1981) (holding that the cause of action against dodor for medical malpractice ac- 
crued when parents were told that infant suffered cerebral palsy as a result of 
lack of oxygen at birth, not later when they learned facts suggesting negligence). 
111. Kubrick, 444 U.S. a t  123. 
112. See cases cited supra note 110. 
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actually aware of facts suggesting defendant's negligence and, 
if not, whether plaintiff should have been aware of these facts. 
Kubrick and the cases that follow it attempt to halt the 
progress of the discovery rule. They draw an arbitrary line and 
refuse to go further. The particular line they draw may be 
difficult to  defend. If it makes sense to  deviate from the express 
language of the statute to  toll the statute when plaintiff is 
blamelessly ignorant of the identity of the individual, it is diffi- 
cult to see why it should not also make sense t o  toll the statute 
when the plaintiff is blamelessly ignorant of facts suggesting 
negligence. Nevertheless, the line preserves some of the 
rulelike qualities of the statute of limitations. 
Although at least one court has referred to Kubrick as the 
majority r~ le , ' '~  recent cases suggest otherwise. A review of 
cases from state courts suggests Kubriek is losing ground as a 
new generation of expansive discovery rules is being adopted. 
Bussineau u. President & Directors of Georgetown Col- 
lege''* is a good example. The plaintiff in that case brought 
an action for dental malpractice. As a result of "an externally 
caused traumatic injury to her face and she 
became a patient at Georgetown Dental School. During the 
course of her treatment there, she complained on numerous 
occasions about the results of the work being done. She experi- 
enced considerable pain and difficulty, including a problem 
with tooth movement. She was assured, however, that the 
treatment she had received was appropriately rendered and 
that the results were simply unfortunate. Not until many years 
later did plaintiff learn from another dentist that the work had 
been shoddily done. Rejecting Kubrick, the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals adopted a rule under which the limitations 
period does not commence until the plaintiff has real or con- 
structive knowledge of her injury, its cause in fact, and some 
evidence of wrongdoing.l16 The plaintiffs case, as articulated 
by her complaint, was thus allowed to  proceed. 
North Coast Air Services, Ltd. u. Grumman Corp.,ll7 a 
products liability case, is another example of an expansion 
113. Mack v. A.H. Robins Co., 573 F. Supp. 149, 154 (D. Ariz. 1983), affd per 
curium, 759 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1985). 
114. 518 A.2d 423 (D.C. 1986). 
115. Id. at 425. 
116. Id. at 435. 
117. 759 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1988). 
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beyond Kubrick. In North Coast, plaintiffs' decedent was a pilot 
who was killed when his small plane crashed. Investigating 
authorities originally attributed the crash to  pilot error. Many 
years later, however, plaintiffs learned that the airplane might 
have been defective. The tworyear limitations period had 
expired if the discovery rule tolled the commencement of the 
limitations period only until the plaintiffs had knowledge or 
should have had knowledge of (1) the plaintiffs' decedent's 
injury and (2) the causal connection between the airplane and 
the injury. It had not expired, however, if the plaintiffs must 
have, in addition, actual or constructive knowledge of the 
wrongfulness of defendant's behavior (for example, in a strict 
liability action, knowledge that the product was defective and 
hence that the defendant placed a defective product into com- 
merce). The court held that such additional knowledge was 
necessary.11s 
118. North Coast was decided nine years after Ohler v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 598 
P.2d 1358, 1360 (Wash. 1979), in which the Washington Supreme Court declared in 
no uncertain terms that a medical malpractice claim "did not accrue until [plain- 
tiff] discovered or reasonably should have discovered all of the essential elements 
of her possible cause of action, i.e. duty, breach, causation and damages." Plaintiff 
had been born prematurely and placed in an incubator where she was adminis- 
tered excessive amounts of oxygen. This exposure resulted in her blindness. For 
many years, she believed that the oxygen had been administered properly and that 
her blindness was an unfortunate by-produd of necessary medical treatment that 
had saved her life. When she learned fads suggesting that the hospital's treatment 
had in fad been contrary to proper medical practice, she brought suit. The court 
held that the limitations period had not expired. In the wake of that decision, the 
Washington State Legislature enacted a statute providing that "no claim under this 
chapter may be brought more than three years from the time the claimant discov- 
ered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the harm and its 
cause." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 8 7.72.060(3) (West Supp. 1992). 
The legislative history of the statute made it reasonably clear that it was 
passed in response to the Ohler decision. The committee report stated that it in- 
tended "to modify the discovery rule announced in Ohler* and that the Ohler rule 
unjustifiably extends the period during which an action may be brought. Wash. St. 
Sen. J., 47th Leg., 626 (1981). 
A colloquy on the floor of the State Senate proceeded as follows: 
Senator Newhouse: "[Ils the statute of limitations provision in section 
7(3) intended to overrule our Supreme Court's decision in Ohler vs. Taco- 
ma General Hospital, in which it was held that the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered each and every 
element of his or her cause of action?" 
Senator Bottiger: "Yes, the discovery rule would apply only to the 
discovery of the harm and its cause. In this context, 'discovery of the 
cause' merely means the discovery that the product was casually [sic] 
connected with the harm. It does not mean the discovery of the nature of 
the defect of the product." 
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Bussineau and North Coast are excellent examples of 
expansive discovery rules. They call upon the trier of fact to 
determine at what point the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of (1) facts suggesting injury; (2) facts suggesting that 
defendant caused the injury; and (3) facts suggesting 
defendant's wrongfulness. When this rule is combined with the 
already existing tolling rule for infancy, insanity and imprison- 
ment, the issue becomes remarkably similar to that presented 
in a laches case: reasonableness. Essentially, the trier of fact is 
asked to determine whether the plaintiff has had a reasonable 
opportunity to bring a lawsuit. The statute of limitations is 
thus stripped of much of its rulelike character. 
Is it a good thing or a bad thing for courts to  have such 
control over law formulation? One optimistic way to look at it 
is this: Legislatures formulate statutes along the rule-standard 
continuum in the manner that they consider to be optimal. The 
statute is then passed to the courts' custody for administration. 
In most cases, the courts will apply the statute in a manner 
consistent with the legislature's original formulation for two 
reasons. First, judges share many values and perceptions about 
the world with members of the legislature and hence do not 
have fundamental disagreements with the legislature about the 
formulation of a law. Second, judges accord the legislature a 
certain amount of deference in any event. Thus, they have no 
desire to deviate from the legislature's vision except in truly 
unusual cases--cases in which circumstances have so changed 
that the legislature's original formulation needs reexamination. 
In those exceptional cases, everg reason exists to believe that 
the legislature would approve of the modification the court has 
adopted--or so the argument runs. 
This approach paints a pretty picture. When applied to the 
statute of limitations specifically, it suggests that the move- 
ment towards expansive discovery rules can be explained solely 
in terms of changing times (in other words, the adoption of 
such rules is the result of the need to accommodate the 
growing number of modern tort victims who are innocently 
ignorant of the circumstances surrounding their causes of 
a~tion)."~ The argument would run thusly: Courts that have 
Wash. St: Sen. J., 47th Leg., 616 (1981). 
Remarkably, the Washington Supreme Court nevertheless held in North Coast 
that the limitations period does not commence until after the plaintiff has actual 
or constructive knowledge of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. 
119. Courts adopting expansive discovery rules justify their decisions by arguing 
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adopted expansive discovery rules have done so with the 
implicit consent of legislatures. These legislatures would prefer 
that courts m o m  original formulations rather than passively 
administer outdated statutes t o  respond to changing cir- 
cumstances. 
This suggestion paints too pretty a picture. The notion that 
legislatures can and should depend upon courts to fine tune 
law formulation along the rule-standard continuum as circum- 
stances change is a bit too optimistic. One of the problems, as I 
have discussed above,'" is that the incentive structure for 
judges tends to  lead them to value appropriate adjudicative 
results more heavily than they should relative to  the conduct 
guidance function of the law. Legislatures may thus be better 
advised to  look askance at judicial modification of statutes. 
In cases like Bussineau and North Coast, courts have 
adopted discovery rules that make it extremely Wicult for 
defendants ever to feel secure. Even in those cases in which 
plaintiff is aware of an injury and the fact the defendant 
caused it, the limitations period will not begin to  run until the 
plaints knows or should have known of fads suggesting the 
defendant's wrongfulness. Consequently, one can expect defen- 
dants to  refrain from using their resources most productively. A 
potential defendant is likely t o  refrain from using resources to 
start up a new enterprise only to have it foreclosed upon if a 
lawsuit is brought. Instead, such a potential defendant will 
prefer to engage in current consumption. As a guide for con- 
duct, such a law is lacking. 
Legislatures would not likely embrace such a profound 
shift in the focus of the statute of limitations. As originally 
drafted, the statute of limitations was neither plaintiff-focused 
nor defendant-focused in the sense that it did not openly 
embrace either the principle that every plaintiff should have a 
reasonable opportunity to bring a claim or the counter-principle 
that times have changed. Under this rationale, for example, the typical tort case at  
law can no longer be governed by as rigid a time limitation. Indeed, the argument 
continues, there is no longer any such thing as the typical tort case. Changing 
technologies have made cases involving unknown or unknowable injuries and caus- 
es of action more numerous than the legislatures that enacted the original statutes 
of limitation could have dreamed. Examples would be the mass tort litigation sur- 
rounding asbestos use or the use of the miscarriage preventative diethylstilbestrol. 
See, e.g., Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (NJ. 1986); Hymowitz v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989). 
120. See supra part II.D.4. 
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that no defendant should have to defend a claim if, on account 
of delay, the defendant has lost evidence. Indeed, in a legis- 
lature filled with different views about limitations policy, this 
may have been the statute of limitation's chief appeal. The 
rulelike statute of limitations essentially worked as a black box 
compromise. I t  forced the competing principles embodied in 
limitations policy into a somewhat arbitrary but workable bal- 
ance. Most, though not all, of the adjudicative results would be 
consistent with both principles. When a n  expansive discovery 
rule was added, however, the balance struck by the legislature 
between the plaintiff-focused principle and the defendant- 
focused principle was jarred massively out of kilter. I t  hardly 
seems likely that this would appeal to legislatures. 
Perhaps most telling is the f a d  that when faced with the 
opportunity to adopt expansive discovery rules, legislatures 
have not acted. Some have declined to adopt any kind of dis- 
covery rule.lzl Others have combined a short statute of 
limitations, softened by a discovery rule, with a longer but 
more rigid statute of repose? The latter solution is a par- 
ticularly interesting one in that it accommodates to some ex- 
tent the changing times argument without wholly sacrificing 
protection for the potential defendant. Legislatures have thus 
demonstrated no enthusiasm for the courts' heavily plaintiff- 
focused, standardlike solution. 
All of this is troubling. If courts systematically overvalue 
adjudication relative to conduct guidance, then courts cannot be 
trusted with the task of formulating laws along the rule-stan- 
dard continuum. Because they are too close to individual con- 
troversies (and too removed from the effects of the laws they 
promulgate on future conduct), they are inclined to overempha- 
size the need for appropriate adjudications a t  the expense of 
appropriate guidance for conduct. Because judges' reputations 
depend on adjudication and not on formulating predictable 
guidance for conduct, they have every reason to favor the goal 
of appropriate adjudication to the detriment of appropriate con- 
duct guidance. 
121. See, e.g., U.C.C. 8 2-724 (1977). 
122. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 95.11 (West 1992). The Florida statute of limi- 
tations for medical malpractice set a two-year limitations period that commences at 
the time of the incident giving rise to the action or at the time the incident is 
discovered or should have been discovered. In no event, however, can an action be 
brought more than four years after the incident. 
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IV. SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR LEGISLATURES 
ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL COURTS 
This article assumes that legislators would prefer to retain 
control over the formulation of the law, and that moreover, if 
my suspicion that judges tend to undervalue the conduct 
guidance function of the law is correct, that legislative 
preference is a good thing. It therefore asks, "How do legis- 
lators retain control?" Sadly, the answer appears to be that in 
the absence of a tradition of judicial deference to legislative 
prerogative in formulation choice, there is very little that legis- 
lators can do except hope that courts will agree with their 
choice of formulation. If judges systematically undervalue the 
conduct-guidance function of the law and therefore consistently 
discount rulelike formulations, the options available to legis- 
lators t o  correct the problem are limited. 
No lawmaker (legislature or otherwise) can successfully 
control the fate of its laws unless it takes into consideration 
and attempts to control the tendency of the law administrator 
t o  make adjustments.lzs This is true for all kinds of law- 
maker-administrator pairs-parents and children, employers 
and employees, school principals and teachers, appellate courts 
and trial courts, and legislatures and courts. Administrators 
are not automatons; they are human beings. Forcing them to  
conform to the lawmaker's plan is no easy task. It cannot be 
avoided, however, unless the lawmaker is willing to cede to the 
administrator the power and responsibility to  determine where 
along the rule-standard continuum the law will be formulated. 
The f i s t  step the lawmaker must take to retain control of 
the laws that it enacts is to  gain a thorough understanding of 
the decision making processes of the law administrator. The 
lawmaker must, as it were, know the administrator. 
Decision-making styles have been catalogued at length. lZ4 
In theory at least, these styles can run the gamut from the 
pure particularist-who refuses to consider rules promulgated 
123. If a lawmaker is convinced that a very rulelike formulation is the best 
possible one for a particular law, it will do the lawmaker no good at all to pro- 
mulgate such a rule if the lawmaker knows the administrator will not accept and 
treat himself or herself as bound by the law's formal terms. The lawmaker must 
somehow adjust the law so that the lawmaker's goals are achieved despite any 
contrary proclivities the administrator may have. Unfortunately, this task may 
prove difficult. 
124. See Schauer, supra note 44. 
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by lawmakers or the various benefits rules bring and instead 
considers only the particular circumstances of the case-to the 
pure rule-bound decision maker, who applies rules mechanical- 
ly regardless of the consequences. In fact, however, both of 
these decision making types may populate the legal literature 
more often than they do the real world. Only an extraordinary 
person could be a true rule-based decision maker, willing to go 
with the rule regardless of the consequences. I t  is hard to 
imagine a judge, for example, who would apply literally a 
three-year statute of limitations to an ordinary tort case even 
when to do so would result in the certain destruction of the 
universe. When the stakes are high enough, even a rule-based 
decision maker will override a rule, assuming that person is a t  
all rational. lZ5 
The same is true for particularists. The true particularist 
does not recognize or approve of rules, and therefore would not 
allow any of the particulars of the immediate fact situation to 
be shrouded from con~ideration. '~~ Finding such a creature in  
nature would be a challenge. No rational reason exists for a 
decision maker to adopt a system that includes everything ex- 
cept the value of rules. I t  makes no more sense than if a deci- 
sion maker were to consider everything except those things 
that  begin with the letter "p."127 
The real world is populated by rule-sensitive particularists. 
In  making a decision, a rule-sensitive particularist takes every- 
thing into consideration, including the existence and benefits of 
any rule.lZ8 R-ulesensitive concerns include the following: (1) 
the superior ability of the lawmaker to determine the best 
course of action, even though the decision is made a t  the 
125. Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 5 (1990). 
126. Calling particularistic decision making the "all things considered" approach 
is not precisely correct, however. All things are not considered using the 
particularistic approach to decision making. The value of rules is not considered. A 
particularistic decision maker, as I use the term, does not consider the value of 
having a rigid or semirigid rule that can be applied to future cases. Each case is 
decided in an historical and institutional vacuum. No thought is given to the need 
for a rule that will control the discretion of adjudicators in the future and provide 
predictable results that can guide either primary activity or decision making in the 
future. For the particularistic decision maker, everything is focused on the here 
and now: the particular before it. Particularistic decision making, as I use the 
term, can thus be contrasted with rule-sensitive particularism which is closer to a 
true "all things considered'' approach, because i t  does indeed consider the value of 
rules in its calculus. 
127. See Alexander, supra note 125. 
128. Schauer, supra note 44. 
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wholesale level; (2) the superior right of the lawmaker to deter- 
mine the course of action, even if incorrect decisions (in the 
immediate sense) are made; (3) the need to preserve decision 
making resources, even a t  the expense of some incorrect 
decisions; (4) the need to have an agreed upon rule, even if i t  is 
second best, so that people can rely upon it; (5) the need to 
have an  agreed upon rule, even if it is second best, so that 
people that will perceive the adjudication process as fair; (6) 
the need to follow the authority of the lawmaker in order to 
influence others with an  inferior ability to discern the best 
course of action; (7) the need to follow the authority of the 
lawmaker in order to discourage the lawmaker from promulgat- 
ing a worse rule; (8) the need to follow the authority of the 
lawmaker in order to discourage others from replacing the 
lawmaker with an authority that is even less beneficial; and (9) 
any penalty the lawmaker may impose for failure to follow the 
rule. Many of these factors should apply with full force even 
when following the rule produces the second best result in a 
particular case. 
All of these considerations and probably others are 
weighed in making a decision about whether to follow an avail- 
able rule.129 The real differences among decision makers is 
not whether they are purely particularistic or purely rule- 
bound, but how heavily they weigh various rule values in their 
calculus. Some will clearly weigh these considerations more 
highly than others. 
The closest one could expect to come to a true rule-based 
decision maker among rational persons is likely to be a rule- 
sensitive particularist who, based on his empirical observations 
and his norms regarding rule values, esteems rules quite 
highly. Conversely, the closest one can expect to come to a true 
particularist in the real world is a rule-sensitive particularist 
who happens to value rules very lightly. 
A lawmaker must approach the administrator from this 
standpoint and determine how highly the administrator values 
rules. Once the lawmaker has sized up the administrator's 
129. It is doubtful that every decision maker consciously and systematically 
considers each of these matters prior to deciding whether to follow a particular 
rule. Moreover, it is doubtful whether a systematic weighing of rule values occurs 
very often. This is because rule-sensitive particularism is telescoping. When a true 
rule-sensitive particularist takes into account the value of a rule that constrains 
discretion, other self-imposed rules about the use of rules may be employed to 
simplify the decision making process. 
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decision-making style, the lawmaker can use that information 
to retain control of the ultimate formulation of the enacted law. 
If the administrator puts a higher value upon rules than the 
lawmaker would have preferred, the lawmaker must fine tune 
the statutory formulation of the law to make it more stan- 
dardlike. Thus, it will be absolutely clear to the administrator 
that  some exercise of discretion is appropriate. 
That is the simple case to solve. If the administrator puts a 
lesser value upon rules than what the lawmaker would prefer 
the solution is more difficult. The lawmaker must alter the 
administrator's calculus by imposing a penalty upon the 
administrator for failing to follow the rule. Such a penalty func- 
tions as a thumb upon the scale, inducing the law administra- 
tors to increase their regard for rules just enough to put them 
in harmony with the lawmaker's plans. The lawmaker can thus 
stay in  control, and the application of the law reflects the law- 
maker's original choice. 
There is, however, a problem. This approach works well if 
the lawmaker is not a legislature and the law administrator is 
not a judge. A parent can affect a child's rule calculus when the 
child starts interpreting a very rulelike directive such as, 
"Always be home by ten o'clock," more loosely than the parent 
intended by grounding the child. An employer can respond to 
an employee whose own view of the importance of rules 
conflicts with the employer's by penalizing the employee for 
failure to follow the rules with a proper degree of formalism. 
Salaries can be set, in part, according to the employee's track 
record. Administrative hoops can be set up for the employee to 
jump through to prevent disobedience. Many options1" are 
available to these 1aw1nakers.l~~ 
130. See Schauer, supra note 44. 
131. If the particularistic decision maker could exist, however, and could promul- 
gate his own laws, he would look a t  the continuum of possible formulations of the 
time-bar norm and choose the most flexible formulation possible. Such a formula- 
tion might go something like this: An action should be time barred if, considering 
all the circumstances, it appears appropriate to do so in view of the length of time 
that has elapsed between the time the cause of action arose and the time the 
action was filed. 
Such a formulation would be defective to the true particularistic decision maker 
because i t  suggests that the only remedy is to bar the action. The decision maker 
will not have the right to impose other remedies for unreasonably tardy filing, 
such as reducing plaintiffs recovery by 50%. A better formulation from the 
particularistic decision maker's point of view would be: An adjudicator should do 
the appropriate thing in view of the length of time that has elapsed between the 
time the cause of action arose and the time the action was filed. Unfortunately 
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The options are not quite as rosy for legislatures attempt- 
ing to control courts. Separation of powers prevents legislatures 
from manipulating judges in quite the same way parents 
manipulate their children or employers manipulate their 
employees. Congress cannot fire an Article I11 judge for an 
incorrect decision; Article I11 judges have life tenure during 
good behavior. Congress cannot diminish the salary of a judge 
during that judge's continuance in office. 
Few tools of judicial control are available to  legislatures. 
That is the way separation of powers is supposed to work and 
correctly so. There is, however, a price to  be paid for separation 
of powers. If I am correct in asserting that judges systemati- 
cally undervalue the role of law as a guide for conduct, courts 
that do not have a very strong ethic in favor of formalistic 
interpretations of statutes will be inclined to reformulate many 
statutes along the rule-standard continuum in a way that sys- 
tematically undervalues rules, and legislatures can do little to 
control this tendency. Their only option is to  continually enact 
more and more specific statutes. 
There are perfectly plausible reasons for applying a more 
rulelike formulation of limitations law to  actions at law and a 
more standardlike rule to equity cases. Nevertheless, recent 
history has witnessed a near convergence between statutes of 
limitation and the doctrine of laches. In particular, through the 
use of discovery rules, many courts have transformed the stat- 
ute of limitations into a near twin of the doctrine of laches. 
Courts have attempted to  justify their departure from a formal 
this formulation will also be defective from the point of view of the true 
particularistic decision maker. Such a decision maker will not appreciate the fact 
that he is constrained to measure the motion of tardiness from the time the cause 
of action arose to the time the cause of action was filed. Why must the decision 
maker be so limited? What if the plaintiff filed quickly but waited an unreasonable 
amount of time to serve the complaint or to conduct discovery? Moreover, why 
should the decision maker be forced to view tardiness in isolation? What action our 
decision maker thinks is appropriate as a result of plaintiffs diligence or lack 
thereof may be contingent upon the action our decision maker has taken on the 
substantive aspects of the case. Ultimately, therefore, our particularistic decision 
maker will have to insist on this formulation: "Do the right thing under all the 
circumstances (but do not consider the value of rules)." Once we have reached this 
point on the rule-standard line, it is questionable whether we are dealing with law 
at all. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(stating that a decision that is "ungoverned by rule" is "ungoverned by law"). 
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reading and application of the statute of limitations (with some 
logic) by pointing out that legislatures could not have anticipat- 
ed the increase in the number of cases that involve unknown 
and unknowable injuries. Such courts are, however, perhaps a 
bit too optimistic in their belief that the enacting legislatures 
would have approved of the convergence. I have outlined sever- 
al reasons why a legislature might nevertheless prefer a very 
rulelike statute of limitations. My purpose in so doing was to 
suggest that courts that change rules into standards should be 
viewed with suspicion, in part because they are increasing their 
own power. 
More important, courts may systematically tend to under- 
value the importance of rulelike formulations for reasons of 
self-interest, quite apart from the direct pursuit of power. Stat- 
utes of limitation, like all laws, have at least two functions. 
They are adjudicative guides and they are conduct guides. The 
optimal formulation for guiding adjudication is not the same as 
the optimal formulation for guiding conduct. Indeed, most law- 
makers would probably find that, in the case of statutes of limi- 
tation, the optimal formulation for the purpose of guiding con- 
duct would be considerably more rulelike than the optimal for- 
mulation for the purpose of guiding adjudication. The need to 
ensure that potential defendants will at some point be able to  
consider themselves immune from suit and go about their busi- 
ness is great. Only rules can give such an assurance. 
Any lawmaker must strike a balance between adjudication 
and conduct according to what it perceives to be the com- 
munity's more pressing need. Unfortunately, judges are likely 
systematically to favor the use of laws as guides for 
adjudication over their use as guides for conduct. When judges 
decide cases, they are responsible for the outcome. If a judge's 
decision does not comport with the community's comprehensive 
view of the case, his or her prestige directly suffers. 
On the other hand, the effect of any particular decision on 
conduct is indirect and tenuous. The public generally will be 
reacting not just to  one decision but to  groups of decisions. 
Judges will therefore be tempted to free-ride on other judges. 
Each judge will attempt to depend upon other judges t o  main- 
tain the intensity of the rule as a conduct guide while she 
cheats a bit for the sake of achieving better adjudicative 
results. The problem is, of course, that all judges have an 
incentive to follow this strategy. If all do, no one is left to 
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maintain the integrity of the rule. -Guiding adjudication ends 
up taking undue precedence over guiding conduct. 
The result with respect to the statute of limitations has 
been predictable. Discovery rules shift considerable discretion 
to judges and juries to determine whether plaintiff knew or 
should have known sufficient facts to bring a cause of action. In 
doing so, they appear to yield fairer outcomes in the specific 
case decided. At the same time, they are likely to yield a far 
inferior result for the conduct guidance function of the law. As 
a result, potential defendants do not and cannot know when it 
is safe to  move their resources, which are otherwise put on hold 
pending litigation, into productive use. If the judge strikes the 
balance between using law as a guide for adjudication and 
using it as a guide for conduct based purely on the judge's self- 
interest, the community loses. 
Unfortunately, there may be little legislatures can do to 
regulate judges' behavior in this regard. Unlike other lawmak- 
er-law administrator relationships, such as parent-child or 
employer-employee relationships, the relationship between 
legislature and judiciary is characterized by separation and 
independence. Legislatures have no power, aside from persua- 
sion, to impose penalties on judges for reformulating a given 
statute along the rule-standard continuum. 
